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eXeCUTive sUMMarY
Party ideology, party affiliation and organized activity by political parties are insti-
tutionalized elements of the political system in Oregon and throughout the nation. 
While most Oregonians would likely agree that our system dominated by two parties 
historically has served our state well, many Oregonians have voiced concerns about 
the nature and extent of partisan behavior and its effect on the functioning of state 
government. 
City Club’s Research Board and Board of Governors charged your committee with 
determining if and when partisan behavior is an impediment to effective governance 
and, if so, what should be done about it. The primary objectives of the study were to 
(1) define partisanship and investigate its impact on Oregon’s political system and 
state government’s ability to effectively govern and resolve key issues and (2) recom-
mend possible solutions for any negative impacts of partisanship, as well as ways to 
support elements of the political system that should be continued.
Although this report examines the problem of excessive partisanship in numerous 
spheres — within the electorate, within party organizations and within government 
— its main focus is within government, and more specifically within the Legislature.
Your committee readily accepted the inherent difficulties of trying to define a 
subjective concept such as “partisanship” and its corollary behaviors. Nevertheless, 
after interviewing numerous witnesses and conducting considerable research, your 
committee settled upon the following definitions of “partisanship” and “excessive 
partisanship”: “Partisanship” is the party allegiance that results from shared values, 
identities, and goals. When partisanship functions well, it serves to help develop com-
peting visions of what is best for Oregon, produce meaningful deliberation, and focus 
the activities of voters and legislators from different parties. “Excessive partisanship,” 
by contrast, is the elevation of party allegiance to such a degree that it interferes with 
the ability of the Legislature to function well. Partisanship becomes excessive when 
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state legislators base their decisions on building and maintaining party power rather 
than on promoting the interests of the public at large. 
Your committee found that experts disagree as to whether the nature of partisanship 
in Oregon has changed significantly in recent years. In fact, partisan behavior has 
waxed and waned over the years, for many reasons, and your committee suspects this 
pattern will continue. Nonetheless, your committee also concluded that it is reason-
able for citizens to try to moderate behaviors and practices that inhibit effective 
lawmaking before and when they occur.
Frequent reports of incessant bickering, mean-spirited attacks on fellow legislators 
and distortion of information came to mind far more quickly for too many people 
than did collegiality among lawmakers, reasonable compromise and fair and accurate 
use of information. Although members of Oregon’s legislative and executive branches 
are often capable and have demonstrated the ability to work together in a bipartisan 
manner, excessive partisanship occurs all too frequently and is especially disabling 
when the state confronts controversial issues that attract the public’s attention. In 
these cases, excessive partisanship represents a substantial obstacle to addressing 
some of the state’s most pressing problems, leads to voter disaffection with the politi-
cal process and discourages qualified individuals from seeking public office.
As previously mentioned, much of this report identifies and discusses the factors 
that contribute to excessive partisanship in the Oregon Legislature. Some of these 
factors are readily apparent. Limited and poor media coverage of the political system 
and a public that is poorly informed about legislative processes and policy issues both 
contribute to excessive partisanship. Strong interest groups aligned with either the 
Democrats or the Republicans also reinforce excessive partisanship by pressuring 
legislators to commit to uncompromising agendas.
Other factors contributing to excessive partisanship, however, are less readily appar-
ent. Surprisingly, your committee found that the greatest concentrations of partisan-
based power are not where it expected to find them. Oregon’s Republican and Demo-
cratic state parties are grass roots organizations that serve the valuable function of 
involving citizens in the political process, but they have little direct involvement in 
the state Legislature. Rather, legislative party caucuses, caucus leaders and presiding 
officers wield the greatest amount of partisan power and influence in Oregon. Legisla-
tive caucus leaders and the presiding officers possess more power than the state par-
ties when it comes to pressuring legislators to support the partisan agendas.
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Because of the structure of Oregon’s Legislature, which is characterized by a strong-
leader system, leaders have tremendous discretion for establishing the degree of parti-
sanship. As most of Oregon’s legislative rules are subject to revision by simple-majority 
vote, they can be — and have been — easily manipulated to satisfy the immediate de-
mands of the majority party in a particular house. Oregon’s legislative rules currently 
give undue authority to its presiding officers, who can easily use these rules to control 
both committee assignments and the movement of legislation in a way that demands 
loyalty from majority party members and that excludes members of the minority party 
from a meaningful role in the legislative process. While committees remain important 
in the Legislature, their power has somewhat diminished because of the increasing 
power of the caucuses. Ostensibly nonpartisan administrative staff officers are also 
subject to the imperatives of the party in control of a particular house. 
This report considers various electoral reforms that have been proposed, including 
nonpartisan elections, the top-two primary, instant run-off voting, multi-member 
districts and fusion voting; campaign finance reforms such as public ownership 
and financing of elections, campaign spending limits and contribution limits; and 
redistricting reform. For most of these proposed reforms, your committee concluded 
that there was not sufficient information to recommend for or against any proposed 
reform. Your committee concluded, however, that alternative elections systems are 
worth exploring and that the process of redistricting can be influenced by partisan 
considerations, giving the party in power at the time of redistricting a tool to increase 
its power in a way that does not accurately represent the wishes of the voters.
Your committee also concluded that a deterioration of legislators’ relationships with 
one another and an increased lack of civility have occurred in recent years. These in 
turn have adversely impacted the deliberative process of the Legislature. 
Your committee believes that the following recommendations will mitigate the 
problem of excessive partisanship and make Oregon’s political system function more 
effectively:
Administration of the Legislature 
The Legislature should hold pre-session conference retreats to provide more 1. 
training and more opportunities for legislators to forge lasting and productive 
professional relationships across party lines.
The Legislature should continue to build upon its efforts to conduct legislative 2. 
business in communities throughout the state and to publish information and 
proceedings online. 
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Legislative Rules and Procedure
The House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that establish propor-3. 
tional representation of party members on committees and permit the leaders 
of each caucus to determine which of its members to appoint to committees. 
When making committee assignments, caucus leaders should take into ac-
count the experience, interest and seniority of legislators.
The House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that require the vice-4. 
chair of each committee to be a member of the minority party, and committee 
chairs should consult with vice-chairs in developing committee agendas.
While the House’s Teamwork Bill is a step in the right direction, the House 5. 
and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that allow each member of the 
Legislature to require a committee hearing on a predetermined number of bills 
during each legislative session.
The House should maintain and the Senate should adopt rules permitting a 6. 
majority of each of their members to require a committee or floor hearing on 
a bill and, in addition, permitting a substantial minority of each of their mem-
bers to require a committee or floor hearing on a bill that has already been 
passed by the other chamber.
The House should maintain and the Senate should adopt rules ensuring that 7. 
the Secretary of the Senate and the Chief Clerk of the House are nonpartisan 
and serve members of both parties, not at the sole discretion of the presiding 
officers. In addition, the House and Senate should employ permanent staff 
with knowledge of substantive policy areas to support the work of committees. 
Once the above rules are adopted, the House and Senate should require a su-8. 
permajority to change these and other rules that protect each member’s right 
to participate in the legislative process.
Constitutional Amendments
The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment establishing 9. 
a nonpartisan redistricting commission.
The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would 10. 
establish annual legislative sessions of limited length, commencing in March, 
shortly after the state Office of Economic Analysis releases its first revenue 
projections for the year.
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The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would 11. 
establish four-year terms for members of the House of Representatives and 
six-year terms for members of the Senate.
Further Study and Advocacy
City Club of Portland should establish a research committee to study alterna-12. 
tive election systems.
City Club of Portland should establish a research committee to prepare a de-13. 
tailed recommendation for a nonpartisan redistricting commission.
City Club should support efforts to increase substantive and objective policy 14. 
news reporting in the media.
City Club of Portland
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During election seasons, personal 
attacks between candidates seem to 
overshadow substantive communication 
with the electorate. While the Legisla-
ture is in session, legislative division 
and stalemate appear to make better 
headlines than stories of compromise 
and achievement. It is certainly true 
that there has been a lot of discussion 
of the negative effects of partisanship in 
the past few years. In late 2005 Gover-
nor Ted Kulongoski and the Legislature 
established the Public Commission on 
the Legislature (PCOL) to examine the 
effectiveness of the Legislature. One 
of the issues that immediately came to 
the attention of the PCOL was political 
partisanship. Several prominent Oregon 
politicians led the charge to examine 
partisanship and how it has affected the 
Legislature.
On September 13, 2005, former Attor-
ney General David Frohnmayer, a mem-
ber of the PCOL, set out “seven aspects 
of a ‘problem statement’ that an agenda 
of legislative reform might address.” 
Among those seven aspects was “politi-
cal partisanship.” “Observers as well as 
participants,” noted Frohnmayer, “have 
seen a sharp increase in partisanship 
and disregard of other views as a major 
source of decline in Oregon’s legislative 
process and performance, leading the 
Legislature to make faulty decisions or 
preventing any decision at all.”
In March 2007 your committee asked 
the opinion research firm Davis, 
Hibbitts & Midghall, Inc., to poll five 
hundred Oregon citizens in order to 
determine their response to the follow-
ing question: “Does the role of political 
parties have a positive or negative effect 
on state government?” Of those who 
responded, 31 percent believed that 
political parties have a positive effect, 
while 51 percent believed that political 
parties have a negative effect. Those 
who thought political parties had a posi-
tive effect expressed two top reasons for 
their view: parties “give people a choice” 
and parties “identify issues and have 
different stands on them.” Those who 
thought political parties had a negative 
effect listed two top reasons for their 
position: parties pursue their own in-
terests rather than the state’s interests, 
and parties make it hard to reach agree-
ment so nothing gets solved. Younger 
inTrodUCTion
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voters tended to view political parties 
more negatively than older voters.
During the course of this study, your 
committee confronted the challenge of 
defining partisanship, considering the 
positive and negative consequences of 
partisanship and identifying ways to 
alleviate the negative effects of excessive 
partisanship on the state. (See Appendix 
A for the committee’s charge.)
The Meaning of Partisanship 
and excessive Partisanship
Some definitions of the words “partisan” 
and “partisanship” have negative conno-
tations. For example, the word “parti-
san” can mean someone who exhibits 
“blind, prejudiced and unreasoning al-
legiance,” while the term “partisanship” 
has been described as “an attitude that 
always favors one way of feeling or act-
ing especially without considering any 
other possibilities.”1 Your committee in-
terviewed three local political scientists, 
Professors Richard Clucas of Portland 
State University, Robert Eisinger of 
Lewis & Clark College, and Paul Gronke 
of Reed College, who generally rejected 
these pejorative associations, instead 
defining the terms neutrally:
Partisans are individuals who share 
certain values, identify with a particular 
political party, and possess a commit-





18% “Don’t Know/No Answer”
Percentage of oregonians Who Believe Political Parties Have  
a Positive or negative effect on state government
Source: “City Club of Portland Partisanship Study Poll,” Davis, Hibbitts, & Midghall Inc., 
March 2007
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Partisanship is the party allegiance 
that results from those shared values, 
identities, and goals.
Your committee chose to adopt the 
neutral definitions favored by these 
academics because such definitions fa-
cilitate analysis of both the valuable and 
destructive effects of political allegiance.
Your committee also concluded early in 
its research that partisanship and the 
two-party system 
serve valuable func-
tions by developing 
competing visions 




ship had worked 
fairly well as a way 
to focus and orga-
nize the activities of 
the Legislature here 
and elsewhere. Tim Hibbitts, an inde-
pendent political analyst who appeared 
before your committee several months 
before his firm did the survey discussed 
above, was of the opinion that having 
two strong parties reduces political frag-
mentation when compared to multi-par-
ty democracies in other countries. Even 
without official political parties, conflicts 
between competing visions would natu-
rally occur in our electoral and legislative 
processes. Party labels serve as useful 
guides to persons of similar back-
grounds, values and interests who wish 
to work together to accomplish common 
goals. When electoral and legislative 
processes work well and partisanship 
remains reasonably constrained, conflict 
between the parties can be informative 
and productive.
Despite the value of partisanship, 
partisan behavior can become excessive, 
thereby undermining effective lawmak-
ing. While running as an Independent 
for governor in 2006, then-Senator Ben 
Westlund commented that partisanship 
was not inherently bad, but “like air and 





play a critical and 
constructive role 
in the formation 
of public policy,” 
but the commis-
sion nevertheless 
concluded that “an 
effective Legisla-
ture encourages 
partisanship to be set aside for the best 
interests of the state.”2 
For the purposes of this study, your 
committee defined excessive partisan-
ship as the elevation of party allegiance 
to such a level that it interferes with 
the ability of the Legislature to func-
tion well. Your committee identified 
five characteristics of a well-functioning 
electoral and legislative system:
Ease of recruitment of well-qual-1. 
ified candidates for legislative 
office.
High electoral participation and 2. 
the election of legislators who 
“for the purposes 
of this study, your 
committee defined 
‘excessive partisanship’ 
as the elevation of party 
allegiance to such a level 
that it interferes with the 
ability of the legislature 
to function well.”
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serve all voters, not just those 
affiliated with major parties or 
strong special interests.
Good relationships and civility 3. 
among legislators.
Deliberation and resolution of 4. 
policy issues with input from the 
majority and minority.
Public respect for and confidence 5. 
in the Legislature.
This report focuses on excessive parti-
sanship as it specifically affects the Or-
egon Legislature. None of the witnesses 
your committee interviewed raised 
concerns about partisanship affecting 
any part of the government other than 
the Legislature, with the sole exception 
o f  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  s e c r e t a r y   
of  state  with respect  to  reditrict-
ing, as discussed later in this report. 
Many county and city elected offices are 
nonpartisan, with candidates’ political 
affiliations not listed on the ballot. The 
same is true of judicial elections. The 
governor and other statewide executive 
officials are elected on a partisan basis, 
but they have a great deal of indepen-
dence once in office. The Legislature is 
particularly affected by partisanship 
because members of both parties are 
elected to the Legislature, and, once 
there, they must compete for control at 
some times and work together at other 
times.
Excessive partisanship in the Legislature 
produces unwelcome outcomes. Exces-
sively partisan legislators support their 
party’s agenda even when it contradicts 
their own individual judgment of what 
is best for the state. They also neglect 
good legislation that might otherwise 
have broad public support. Further-
more, excessive partisanship degrades 
the abilities of legislators to deliberate 
and collaborate — abilities that are 
essential to our legislative process. In 
an excessively partisan Legislature, the 
majority uses its control to consolidate 
power and advance its agenda, while 
the minority uses its limited rights to 
stall and disrupt the majority’s agenda. 
Either the majority successfully silences 
the minority and advances its agenda 
without real debate, or the minority suc-
cessfully resists the majority’s agenda, 
resulting in legislative gridlock. In the 
meantime, both the majority and the 
minority posture for the next election. 
Finally, excessive partisanship corrodes 
public trust in political institutions and 
discourages otherwise promising candi-
dates from running for legislative office. 
Distinguishing between partisanship 
and excessive partisanship can some-
times be difficult. As he left Wash-
ington, D.C., Tom DeLay, the former 
U.S. House Majority Leader, defended 
intensely partisan politics, noting that 
“partisanship properly understood, is 
not a symptom of democracy’s weak-
ness, but of its health and strength....” 
While DeLay recognized that “politics 
demands compromise,” he stated that 
compromise and bipartisanship are 
means and not ends and that “[i]t is not 
the principled partisan, however ob-
noxious he may seem to his opponents, 
who degrades the public debate, but the 
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preening, self-styled statesman who el-
evates compromise to a first principle.”3
The PCOL viewed matters differently 
when it called attention to “[e]xcessive 
partisanship at the expense of collabora-
tion and creative problem solving.” In its 
final report, the PCOL stated that the 
“public perception is that non-construc-
tive partisanship erodes public faith in 
the Legislature and its ability to find 
reasonable compromise.”
As noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, partisanship is an essential and 
positive feature of the legislative pro-
cess. Partisanship helps political actors 
develop and more precisely articulate 
their values and goals. It helps forge 
a sense of common identity among 
otherwise isolated voters. Furthermore, 
partisanship serves to focus political 
activities of people with common values 
and identities towards realization of 
those shared goals. When partisanship 
functions effectively in the Legisla-
ture, it results in a productive tension 
between legislators from different 
parties. That tension manifests itself in 
meaningful deliberation, a willingness 
to set aside dogmatism and personal 
acrimony, and an openness to pragmatic 
consensus-building and lawmaking. 
is excessive Partisanship on 
the rise and is it a Problem in 
oregon?
Partisanship is difficult to measure. Po-
litical scientists have tracked how often 
voters registered with a political party 
vote for that party’s candidates, but an 
increase in that metric may not be a sign 
of unhealthy partisanship. It could in-
stead indicate changes in the issues that 
matter to voters, or it could result from 
demographic shifts. Researchers have 
not tabulated how frequently votes in 
the Legislature have divided along party 
lines in Oregon. Even if that data were 
available, the data would be difficult to 
interpret. An increase in divided votes 
would not necessarily indicate greater 
partisanship, as presiding officers 
control whether controversial bills even 
receive a hearing. Your committee was 
unable to identify any empirical basis 
for determining whether excessive par-
tisanship — as your committee defines 
it — has risen in Oregon 
Your committee heard many witnesses 
express their opinions about excessive 
partisanship. The perception of most 
was that excessive partisanship has 
been rising and has sometimes bitterly 
divided the Legislature to the point of 
dysfunction, but a strong and persuasive 
minority disagreed. 
Leading the opinion that partisanship 
is not on the rise were the academic 
witnesses, joined by several former or 
current political insiders. They felt that 
the Legislature functions reasonably 
well and that partisanship as the public 
knows it today is no more “excessive” 
than it has been in the past. Professors 
Clucas, Eisinger and Gronke acknowl-
edged that political tactics and rhetoric 
have changed in recent years, but they 
generally agreed that partisanship 
has been an historic part of American 
politics. They observed peaks and valleys 
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of partisan behavior in this nation’s and 
this state’s history, and they challenged 
the notion that partisan behavior has 
been especially problematic in recent 
years. Former Governor Barbara Rob-
erts also cautioned against undue nos-
talgia for the “good old days.” She cited 
the example of her late husband Frank 
Robert’s service in the Oregon House 
in the late 1960s while in the minority 
party. After challenging the Speaker 
on an issue, he was penalized by not 
getting appointed to a single interim 
committee.
Witnesses in the opposing camp felt 
that politics in Oregon has become more 
ideologically and rigidly divided in re-
cent years, and they provided some tell-
ing examples. Jeff Merkley, a Democrat 
and the House minority leader in the 
2005 session and Speaker of the House 
in the 2007 session, noted that when he 
worked as an intern in Republican Sena-
tor Mark Hatfield’s office, he was never 
asked his party affiliation. He doubted 
anyone would be hired today without a 
background check on their partisan cre-
dentials. Then-Senate Majority Leader 
Kate Brown concurred that party labels 
matter more now than they did in the 
past.
Charles Beggs, a retired journalist who 
covered the state capitol with the As-
sociated Press for forty years, main-
tained that partisanship has been much 
more intense during the last three or 
four legislative sessions, with the more 
extreme members of each party exerting 
greater control and overshadowing the 
centrists. Lobbyists Pat McCormick 
and Dave Barrows also 
believed that partisan-
ship has become a greater 
problem in recent sessions, 
adding that moderates 
who cooperate with the 
opposing party risk falling 
out of favor with their own 
leadership. McCormick, 
a lobbyist with Conkling, 
Fiskum & McCormick, Inc., 
noted that moderates from 
both major parties reached 
across the aisle more in the 
past, but now they would be ostracized 
by the other members of their party for 
doing so. Barrows, a lobbyist with Dave 
Barrows & Associates, and regarded by 
some as the “dean of the lobbying corps 
in Oregon,” also recalled a time when 
legislative leaders from both parties 
worked together on major legislation, 
including Oregon’s famed 1967 beach 
bill, which he thought could not happen 
in today’s political climate. Some of the 
committee’s witnesses maintained that 
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candidates like Mark Hatfield, Wayne 
Morse and Al Ullman could not be 
elected in the current climate. 
Not all of the witnesses who believe 
that partisanship has increased in 
Oregon think that the increase is a sign 
of dysfunction. Instead, they point to 
changes in society and argue that a more 
polarized public will naturally result in a 
more polarized legislature. Tim Hibbitts 
asserted that politics is more partisan 
than it was thirty years ago. Hibbitts 
offered the opinion that the Democratic 
Party had become more liberal and the 
Republican Party more conservative, not 
as a result of the organized efforts of po-
litical parties, but because the public has 
been drawn more and more to uncom-
promising ideologies. Governor Victor 
Atiyeh added that “the main cause of 
the problem [of excessive partisan-
ship] is not the elected people, but the 
people who elect them.” In short, a more 
partisan legislature is a natural result of 
a more partisan electorate.
Professor Clucas has described the two 
major ideologies of the role of govern-
ment in Oregon as progressivism and 
conservative populism. In recent years 
progressives have tended to cluster in 
urban areas and vote for Democrats. 
Conservative populists, by contrast, are 
generally located in rural areas and vote 
for Republicans. “[M]uch of Oregon’s 
political conflict,” writes Clucas, “reflects 
the collision of the progressives’ strong 
support for an active government and 
the conservative populists’ general 
desire to limit government.”4 In this 
environment, Republicans and Demo-
crats can be expected to present starkly 
different visions for Oregon and to 
compete vigorously for control of state 
government. 
Oregon has experienced major socio-
economic changes since the early 1970s 
that have reinforced these ideological 
differences. Oregon was once more 
homogenous, economically and socially, 
and until the late 1950s Republicans 
were the majority in the Legislature. 
(See Appendix E.) Through the 1970s 
and 80s, Republicans and Democrats 
were both elected from all parts of the 
state. With the decline of the timber 
industry in rural areas and the rise of 
high-technology businesses in the Port-
land metropolitan area, Oregon today 
is culturally and economically more 
divided, with dramatic differences from 
region to region.5 These local develop-
ments, some of which reflect national 
trends, have exacerbated ideological dif-
ferences between urban and rural areas. 
Political analyst Bob Moore pointed to 
this growing political segregation along 
geographical lines as one of the most 
dangerous trends in the nation — no 
different than religious or racial segrega-
tion — and not healthy for the country.
Several witnesses also pointed to na-
tional influences on the partisan climate 
in Oregon. In her 2006 book, Fight Club 
Politics: How Partisanship is Poisoning the 
House of Representatives, Juliet Eilperin 
provides evidence of institutional-
ized incivility at the federal level on 
both sides of the aisle, including public 
insults directed at both the opposing 
side and non-conforming members of 
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the same party. Barrows and Merkley 
both attribute some of the excessive 
partisanship witnessed in recent legisla-
tive sessions in Oregon to the strident 
ideological views and aggressive political 
tactics of former Congressmen Newt 
Gingrich and Tom DeLay. Tony Van 
Vliet, a Republican state representa-
tive from Corvallis from 1974 to 1994 
concurred, as did former Republican 
U.S. Senator Robert Packwood. Van Vliet 
traced the change to the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, when GOPAC, a national 
political action committee led by then-
Congressman Gingrich, embarked on 
a nationwide campaign to build a Re-
publican political infrastructure capable 
of winning and maintaining control 
of state and local governments across 
the United States. Through campaign 
seminars, workbooks, audiotapes and 
grassroots organizing, GOPAC became 
the Republican Party’s education and 
training center. In particular, train-
ing tapes produced and distributed by 
GOPAC galvanized Republican candi-
dates and activists. GOPAC material 
made clear that no member should co-
operate with a Democrat. In Van Vliet’s 
words, “If you talked to a Democrat, you 
were a traitor.”
While degrees of partisanship elude 
precise measurement, the dominant 
perception among the witnesses in-
terviewed by your committee was that 
excessive partisanship has increased 
in Oregon over the past several de-
cades. Your committee concluded that 
excessive partisanship is a problem 
in Oregon that has inhibited effective 
lawmaking.Your committee’s witnesses 
unanimously expressed the view that 
genuine deliberation and compromise is 
an essential ingredient in the governing 
process. Your committee could not agree 
more. There are certainly times when 
fidelity to one’s principles is honorable 
and socially valuable. However, given 
that Oregon’s legislators represent di-
verse economic and geographic regions, 
thoughtful and respectful deliberation 
is necessary to address the unique needs 
of each district while compromising to 
deliver what is best for the state as a 
whole.
Your committee believes that when 
the Legislature is perceived as an 
acrimonious and dysfunctional body, 
well-qualified potential candidates are 
discouraged from running and serv-
ing, which in turn further erodes the 
public’s respect for government. If the 
public perceives that its elected officials 
are motivated by partisanship at the 
expense of the public’s best interests, 
the resultant loss of confidence in state 
government may encourage apathy or 
circumvention of the legal process.
Your committee also agreed with the 
conclusion of the PCOL that excessive 
partisanship comes at “the expense of 
collaboration and creative problem solv-
ing,” “erodes public faith in the Legis-
lature and its ability to find reasonable 
compromise,” and “discourages many 
qualified candidates from running for 
legislative office.”6 Excessive partisan-
ship is a problem that warrants atten-
tion from all Oregonians. 
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areas for reform
Based on the testimony of witnesses, 
your committee identified two major 
areas for reform: (1) legislative admin-
istration, rules and procedure, and 
(2) the design of our election system. 
In addition, because many witnesses 
emphasized the importance of strong 
relationships among legislators as a 
counterbalance to partisanship, your 
committee analyzes several ideas for 
how to promote good working relation-
ships in the Legislature. Finally, many 
witnesses also mentioned the influence 
of the public and the media on partisan 
behavior in the Legislature, so your 
committee discusses that issue in the 
final chapter and considers whether any 
reforms are possible.
Before launching into a discussion 
of the first major area for reform — 
legislative administration, rules and 
procedure — it is first necessary to lay 
a foundation by describing the partisan 
power structure. The following chapter 
will explain the roles of state political 
parties, legislative caucuses and interest 
groups in developing partisan allegiance 
among legislators. 
Chapter Conclusions
Partisanship serves to help develop  ➤
and clarify competing visions of 
what is best for Oregon, and it 
helps focus the activities of voters 
and legislators from different par-
ties.
Excessive partisanship is widely  ➤
perceived as having increased over 
the past several decades in Oregon.
Excessive partisanship is a problem  ➤
in Oregon that should be addressed 
because it impairs legislators’ abil-
ity to deliberate and collaborate 
on legislation, results in legislative 
gridlock, discourages qualified can-
didates from running for office and 
leads to voter disaffection.
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The Speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate President are 
the presiding officers of the House and 
Senate respectively. They are elected at 
the beginning of the legislative ses-
sion by the members of their assembly. 
The Speaker of the House and Senate 
President control the operations of the 
Legislature by appointing members to 
committees and selecting committee 
chairs, assigning bills to committees and 
setting agendas for legislative sessions. 
The presiding officers also typically play 
an important role in fundraising for 
their party members.
The members of the two major parties in 
the House and the Senate are organized 
into legislative caucuses: House and 
Senate Democrats and House and Sen-
ate Republicans. The majority and mi-
nority caucuses in each house elect their 
caucus leaders: House Majority Leader, 
Senate Majority Leader, House Minor-
ity Leader and Senate Minority Leader. 
Caucus leaders advance common goals 
of party members in the Legislature and 
strive to maintain or win majority con-
Although Oregon’s Republican and 
Democratic state parties work to ad-
vance partisan interests, these parties 
are not the most powerful political 
organizations in the state. Rather, the 
legislative party caucuses, often highly 
reliant upon special interest groups, 
wield the greatest amount of partisan 
power and influence in Oregon. The 
picture that emerges is not so much of 
a unified hierarchical structure as of 
a coalition of groups that attempt to 
coordinate with each other in the name 
of the state party. In short, legislative 
caucuses and interest groups frequently 
fuel excessive partisanship in Oregon 
more than do the parties themselves.
Before continuing, some definitions are 
in order:
State parties are membership organiza-
tions that engage the public by register-
ing voters, organizing volunteer efforts 
in support of the party’s candidates in 
general elections, and developing party 
platforms.
sTaTe ParTies, legislaTive  
CaUCUses and inTeresT groUPs
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ported by a small number of full-time 
staff members. These administrative 
organizations are so small that much 
of the parties’ work is done through 
volunteer efforts. In comparison to their 
counterparts in other states, Oregon’s 
major state parties are relatively small 
administrative organizations with 
limited influence. According to Amy 
Langdon, past executive director of the 
Oregon Republican Party, other similar-
sized states, such as Nevada, have party 
offices with two-to-three times the staff.
The two major state parties are rela-
tively independent of the county parties 
and the national parties. Senator Peter 
Courtney, President of the Senate since 
2003, noted that some of the county 
parties are even more active than the 
state parties. The county party is con-
trolled by representatives elected from 
precincts. The county parties choose del-
egates to serve as their representatives 
in the state party; the state parties, in 
turn, choose delegates to serve as their 
representatives in the national party. 
The national parties do not control 
the state parties, and the state parties 
do not control the county parties. The 
national parties may, however, exercise 
influence over the state parties through 
distribution of funds.
Each of the major state parties is 
responsible for the development of 
the party platform, but legislators are 
in no way bound by these platforms. 
Party platforms are debated and decided 
upon by delegates. The state parties use 
their platforms as a way of providing 
information to the public about their 
trol by leading caucus meetings during 
legislative sessions, recruiting legislative 
candidates, and raising and distributing 
campaign funds.
Partisan interest groups are groups 
that align with one party to promote 
favored legislation and prevent passage 
of disfavored legislation. They do so 
by funding like-minded candidates in 
primary and general elections, mobi-
lizing volunteers, appealing to voters 
during campaigns, and calling on party 
members to adhere to the group’s policy 
positions during legislative sessions.
state Parties
As nearly all legislators in recent legisla-
tive sessions have belonged either to 
the Republican or Democratic parties, 
your committee has chosen to focus this 
section of its report on the role that the 
two major state parties play in promot-
ing partisanship in the Oregon Legisla-
ture. Your committee learned that the 
major state parties are basically small 
administrative organizations with little 
power and influence. They help register 
voters, develop party platforms, and 
organize volunteer efforts in support of 
the party’s candidates for national and 
executive-branch state office, but they 
play little to no role in setting partisan 
legislative agendas. Your committee has 
concluded that their role in promoting 
excessive partisanship in the Legislature 
is negligible. 
Both major state parties are led by 
executive directors, who are in turn sup-
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positions on issues. But once adopted, 
the platforms have little effect on candi-
dates or legislators. Candidates running 
on a state party’s ticket are not required 
to agree with the party platform. In fact, 
according to former Democratic House 
Speaker Jeff Merkley, many legisla-
tors have never even read their state 
parties’ platforms. Therefore, although 
platform discussions often attract the 
most devoted party members who may 
put strong planks in the platform, those 
party faithful are not likely to influence 
the legislators through the platform 
itself.
The state’s major parties — often with 
the financial assistance of the national 
parties — recruit candidates for state-
wide executive-branch and national 
offices and support these candidates in 
the general election by getting informa-
tion to voters, providing volunteers and 
mailings for candidates, and registering 
and mobilizing voters. But they do not 
actually choose the parties’ candidates 
for the general election. Rather, each 
party’s candidates are determined in the 
primary election, and anyone regis-
tered as a party member may vote in 
the primary. Each state party generally 
supports its incumbents in the primary, 
although county parties have been 
known to endorse candidates other than 
incumbents. If there is no incumbent 
and there is more than one candidate 
for the party’s nomination, the state 
party does not typically endorse one 
candidate; but party members, even leg-
islators themselves, can and do support 
challengers in the primary.
Despite their significant, but limited, 
role in running candidates for state-
wide executive office and national office, 
the state parties play negligible roles in 
races for the Oregon Legislature. The 
limited role of Oregon’s state parties in 
legislative elections is further high-
lighted by the fact that state parties in 
most other states wield considerable 
authority when it comes to recruiting 
candidates and supporting campaigns 
for state legislative office. When it 
comes to races for the Legislature, the 
state parties in Oregon defer to partisan 
legislative caucuses. Neel Pender, former 
executive director of the Democratic 
Party of Oregon, told your committee 
that there existed a “healthy division of 
labor” between the state party and the 
partisan legislative caucus as to recruit-
ment of candidates. Amy Langdon, who 
was the executive director of the Repub-
lican Party of Oregon at the time of her 
interview, noted that her party has been 
in a period of restructuring so that the 
legislative caucuses have taken on more 
power, including recruitment. 
Your committee concluded that the 
Republican and Democratic state parties 
in Oregon are grassroots organizations 
that serve the valuable function of 
recruiting candidates for office and in-
volving citizens in the political process, 
but that these state parties have little 
direct influence over the Legislature. 
Your committee also concluded that 
none of the minority parties had at-
tained sufficient impact to be considered 
as contributing to or against excessive 
partisanship in the Legislature. Finally, 
City Club of Portland
12
Bridging the ParTisan divide
13
none of the witnesses your committee 
interviewed put any blame for excessive 
partisanship in the Legislature on the 
state parties, and your committee did 
not find it necessary to consider any 
reforms directed at the state parties.
legislative Caucuses
Legislative caucuses play a far greater 
role in promoting partisanship than the 
state parties. Indeed, Senate President 
Peter Courtney 
noted that the state 
parties fall into the 
background when 
legislative sessions 
begin, at which 
time the caucuses 
become very active 
and exert substan-
tial power over 
party members.
The party cau-
cuses consist of the 
members of a political party within the 
Legislature. Political affiliation provides 
the organizing principle of legislative 
activity, including the election of presid-
ing officers. In Oregon, the members 
of the party having the most seats in a 
particular house coordinate their votes 
to select their presiding officers: the 
President of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives. Shortly 
thereafter, the four caucuses then elect 
their caucus leaders: the House Majority 
Leader, the House Minority Leader, the 
Senate Majority Leader and the Senate 
Minority Leader. 
As discussed below, the President of 
the Senate and the House Speaker have 
substantial power over legislative pro-
ceedings and over the appointment of 
legislators to committees. They appoint 
committee chairs, who in turn have 
considerable influence on committee 
proceedings. The Speaker of the Oregon 
House of Representatives in particular 
has been identified as the fifth most 
powerful state house speaker in the 
country.7 This high ranking is primarily 
due to the Oregon Speaker’s generous 
power to appoint 
party leaders and 
the chairs of stand-




mittee system, to 
provide campaign 
assistance and ad-
ditional staff, and 
to control the legis-
lative calendar and 
procedures, in addition to the unlimited 
number of years he or she may serve as 
Speaker.8 The next chapter of this report 
will discuss the powers of the presiding 
officers in more detail. At this point, it is 
enough to note that the powers associ-
ated with these positions create strong 
incentives for the legislative caucuses to 
strive for majority status and for legisla-
tors in the majority party to be loyal to 
their presiding officer.
The roles of party caucus leaders are 
not formally defined, but caucus leaders 
nevertheless exert tremendous influ-
ence within the Legislature. According 
“legislative caucuses play a 
far greater role in promoting 
partisanship than the state 
parties.… [T]he state parties 
fall into the background 
when legislative sessions 
begin, at which time the 
caucuses become very active 
and exert substantial power 
over party members.”
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to Professor Clucas, “The main job of the 
caucus leaders is to promote their par-
ty’s political and policy goals. Although 
they are not the top leaders in the 
state parties, the caucus leaders in the 
majority party often play a more direct 
role in planning strategy and champion-
ing party goals than the speaker or the 
president.”9 One important role of a 
caucus leader is building and maintain-
ing majority control through the recruit-
ment of candidates and fund-raising. 
During legislative sessions, the caucus 
leaders convene frequent meetings of 
their members, in which they share 
information, develop policy goals and 
plan strategy. Caucus meetings have tra-
ditionally been conducted behind closed 
doors, with some short-lived exceptions. 
During caucus meetings, members often 
educate their colleagues about bills 
pending before their committees.
Several witnesses noted that members 
of the Legislature find caucus meetings 
useful because they can discuss candidly 
why their constituents are opposed to 
party-backed measures. Legislators 
are free to ask questions they would be 
reluctant to ask on the floor. Legisla-
tive staff may also be present to provide 
fiscal or legal background or to lay out 
parliamentary options, but caucus 
members typically dismiss nonpartisan 
staff when discussing political strategy. 
In addition to the political aspects of the 
caucuses, the caucus offices also provide 
support services to the members of the 
Legislature, such as conducting re-
search, writing speeches and preparing 
press releases. The caucus offices may 
also serve as liaisons to state and federal 
agencies to assist constituents.10 
The strong pressure on individual 
legislators to conform to legislative 
priorities of their caucus is well recog-
nized.  Shortly after his 2006 election, 
then-freshman Democrat Ben Cannon 
was advised by a more senior legislator 
that he should support decisions of the 
Democratic caucus.11 Senator Charlie 
Ringo, a Democrat from Beaverton, 
also commented on the power of the 
Democratic caucus leaders to dictate a 
legislative agenda for its members.
Legislators will naturally be sensi-
tive to how their legislative decisions 
may be judged by their constituents in 
the next election. Caucus leaders can 
use the specter of defeat in the next 
primary election to bring their members 
into consensus on key issues for the 
party. Dave Barrows described how an 
outside campaign consultant managed 
the agenda of the Republican caucus 
during the 2005 session, insisting that 
members “sing from this hymnal,” which 
was perceived by some as coercive and 
excessively partisan. Several witnesses 
also pointed to the example of House 
members Cheryl Walker and Vic Back-
lund, both Republicans, being targeted 
in the primary because of disagreements 
with their caucuses on budget and tax 
issues. 
In the 2007 session, the House Re-
publican leadership effectively used 
caucus meetings to “lock down” votes 
against revenue bills that enjoyed, at 
least initially, bipartisan support. House 
City Club of Portland
14
Bridging the ParTisan divide
15
Republicans assembled the necessary 
votes to block passage of bills to raise 
the corporate minimum tax, to create 
a dedicated tax for affordable housing, 
and to raise the cigarette tax to fund 
children’s health coverage. All of these 
bills initially appeared to have enough 
Republican support to pass, but after 
a caucus meeting, the support disap-
peared.
The principal power exerted by presiding 
officers and caucus leaders comes from 




to leadership PACs 
that are largely 
controlled by the 
caucus leaders or 
presiding officers. 
Those officers then 
have the power to 
divide the funds 
among their par-
ties’ candidates. 
The leaders can 
reward loyal party 
members with greater contributions 
and refuse to assist candidates who are 
perceived not to be toeing the party 
line. The considerable financial power 
of legislative leaders over potential 
campaign funds is a tool that can be 
used in excessively partisan ways to 
secure loyalty from party members in 
the Legislature. Your committee agreed 
with the concern expressed by Governor 
Barbara Roberts over the current power 
of the caucuses and the leadership PACs, 
and the fact that the leadership can use 
the PAC, virtually unfettered, to ensure 
continued leadership and to reward 
loyal party members and punish disloyal 
party members.
interest groups
While interest groups are an essential 
component of a robust democracy, they 
nonetheless play a significant role in 
fueling excessive partisanship. They 
do so in a number of ways. Interest 
groups serve as a 
principal source of 
funds for leadership 
PACs, they provide 
funds to candidates 
who support their 
causes, and they 
hire lobbyists to in-
fluence legislators.
Before discussing 
in more detail how 
interest groups 
often serve to 
promote excessive 
partisanship, a few definitions relating 
to interest groups are in order. An inter-
est group itself is an organized group of 
people with common interest in some 
particular political issue. There are at 
least two different types of interest 
groups. An interest group may represent 
constituencies of people organized by 
occupation, like teachers or building 
owners. An interest group may repre-
sent people who share a similar value, 
like environmentalists or tax reformers. 
Both types of interest groups may be 
“The principal power 
exerted by presiding 
officers and caucus leaders 
comes from their control 
over the distribution of 
campaign money.… The 
leaders can reward loyal 
party members with greater 
contributions and refuse to 
assist candidates who are 
perceived not to be toeing 
the party line.”
City Club of Portland
16
Bridging the ParTisan divide
17
involved in advocating for or against 
issues that are particularly divisive or 
controversial and in ways that are not 
susceptible to compromise. The more 
interest there is among public mem-
bers in the issues advanced by interest 
groups, the more likely the group will be 
able to accumulate the funds and influ-
ence that it may use to advance its goals 
with legislators. These are fundamental 
elements of democracy: constituents 
telling their representatives what they 
want through the medium of organized 
interest groups.
Many interest groups hire lobbyists to 
serve this function. More than 300 hun-
dred groups have registered lobbyists at 
the state capitol. Oregon ranks twenty-
second in the nation for the number of 
entities that use lobbyists. The number 
of lobbyists working in the state capitol 
also seems to be growing. The associa-
tion of Oregon lobbyists, known as the 
Capitol Club, listed 385 members in 
2001 — a considerable increase from 
300 in 1991.12 Many political watchers 
are uncomfortable with this apparent 
increase in the number of lobbyists 
working on behalf of interest groups in 
the state capitol. At the same time, as 
one observer said, one cannot bemoan 
the rise of interest groups if one favors 
greater civic engagement on the part of 
the public.
Interest groups and their lobbyists 
play a number of different roles with 
regard to the Legislature. Lobbyists 
often make a positive contribution 
to the Legislature because they study 
policy issues and inform legislators who 
themselves have neither the time nor 
staff to research every policy issue that 
comes before them. The most effective 
lobbyists are those who have developed 
a reputation for honesty, and lobbyists 
who are not candid with legislators lose 
the trust of those legislators.13 Interest 
groups often do more than just talk to 
legislators — they also make campaign 
contributions and mobilize voters in 
elections.
This report focuses on interest groups 
that are aligned with one or the other 
major political party, and your commit-
tee calls them “partisan interest groups.” 
Your committee distinguishes those 
groups from interest groups that donate 
money to both Republican and Demo-
cratic candidates even-handedly in order 
to gain access to whichever candidate 
is elected. Partisan interest groups that 
consistently support only Democratic 
candidates or only Republican candi-
dates function essentially as extensions 
of the parties. They may provide support 
not just through campaign donations 
but also by mobilizing their members 
to vote for the party’s candidate and, in 
some cases, even campaigning directly 
for the candidate.
Partisan interest groups generally 
include those with large, or very well-
funded, constituencies and those with 
an ideological focus. Some examples on 
the Democratic side are public employee 
and other labor unions, environmental-
ists and pro-choice supporters. On the 
Republican side are social conservatives, 
some business interests, anti-tax groups 
and pro-life supporters. This does not 
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mean, for example, that there are no 
Democrats who are pro-life and no Re-
publicans who are pro-choice. However, 
Republican and Democratic legislators 
tend to align with particular groups, 
which in turn support them with money 
and volunteers.
Partisan interest groups have significant 
influence and impact. Almost half of 
those interviewed expressed the view 
that partisan interest groups controlled 
party agendas and that interest groups 
were more powerful than state par-
ties. Interest groups, they argued, play 
a strong role in promoting excessive 
partisanship in the Legislature. The con-
cern that contributions from interested 
parties may taint a legislator’s judgment 
is reflected in the fact that there are 
stringent reporting requirements for 
all legislators who receive contributions 
during the legislative session.14
Your committee concluded that partisan 
interest groups interfere with delibera-
tion and compromise between legisla-
tors of opposite parties in two principal 
ways:
First, as will be discussed in more 
detail in the chapter on campaigns and 
elections, since aspiring legislators 
must run for election first in a partisan 
primary, they are hard put to suggest 
compromises that displease their party’s 
base. Interest groups play a key role in 
primary elections, potentially providing 
both financial and volunteer resources. 
In addition, interest groups can recruit 
and support challengers to incumbents 
in the primary where the groups per-
ceive that the incumbent has not been 
faithful to the special interest group’s 
needs. Two of Oregon’s larger labor 
unions — the SEIU and the Oregon 
Education Association — together gave 
over $350,000 to Representative Greg 
MacPherson’s opponent, John Kroger, 
in the 2008 Democratic primary race for 
Oregon’s attorney general. This dollar 
figure amounted to almost half of the 
total funds that now-Attorney General 
Kroger raised for the primary campaign. 
Many political observers speculated 
that these unions gave this significant 
amount of money to Mr. Kroger as “pay-
back” for Representative MacPherson’s 
role in drafting and promoting legisla-
tion in 2003 that changed the public 
employees’ retirement system and cut 
public employee benefits. The unions 
had adamantly opposed this legislative 
effort.
Second, partisan interest groups tend to 
characterize issues in a black-and-white, 
good-versus-evil manner, thus encour-
aging ideological rigidity and making 
it difficult for legislators of opposing 
parties to talk about controversial issues 
productively. When partisan interests 
demand a specific legislative result, 
which they often do, they may toler-
ate no compromise by their allies in 
the Legislature. The resulting legisla-
tive discussion focuses not on finding 
a reasonable solution but on achieving 
a specific and pre-approved result. For 
a legislator to participate in an open 
or exploratory dialogue regarding the 
issues affecting partisan interests sug-
gests that compromise is possible and 
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thus sends a worrisome signal to the 
concerned partisan interests. Political 
discourse in these situations is therefore 
reduced to well-worn sound bites, with 
the goal of pushing a partisan agenda 
rather than engaging in the process of 
finding a solution. The result is a situa-
tion in which each side sees the legisla-
tive process as an “all-or-nothing” effort, 
with victory possible only through the 
absolute defeat of one’s opponents. The 
polarization can then extend to less 
controversial issues, as legislators who 
see each other as “the enemy” lose the 
ability or interest to work together.
Your committee concluded that partisan 
interest groups often reinforce exces-
sive partisanship. The legislative process 
attracts partisan interest groups that 
push their individual and sometimes 
uncompromising agendas. Industry 
groups, labor unions, religious conserva-
tives and other interest groups use their 
issues to energize their constituents and 
apply pressure on individual legislative 
members. These interest groups can 
sway legislators because there may be 
a high political cost for rejecting their 
uncompromising positions.
Chapter Conclusions
Oregon’s Republican and Demo- ➤
cratic state parties are grassroots 
organizations that serve the valu-
able function of involving citizens 
in the political process, but they 
have little involvement in the Legis-
lature. 
Legislative caucus leaders and pre- ➤
siding officers possess more power 
than state parties when it comes to 
pressuring legislators to support 
partisan agendas.
Strong interest groups aligned with  ➤
either the Democrats or the Re-
publicans often reinforce excessive 
partisanship by pressuring legisla-
tors to commit to uncompromising 
agendas.
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Anyone can be tempted to abuse power 
for partisan advantage, and many wit-
nesses explained that Oregon’s legisla-
tive leaders have frequently succumbed 
to this temptation. The temptation 
stems primarily from the nature of 
the legislative rules that govern the 
legislative process. In contrast to some 
other states, where 
legislative rules are 
defined in statutes, 
most rules that 
regulate Oregon’s 
legislative process 
can be modified by 
simple-majority 
vote of the House or 
the Senate. Lead-
ers of both par-
ties — while they 
enjoy their major-
ity status — have 
regularly chosen to 
interpret legislative rules in their own 
favor or to modify them through simple-
majority vote in order to consolidate 
power and to exert partisan control 
over committee assignments and the 
movement of legislation. This form of 
excessive partisanship rewards the con-
solidation of party power rather than 
meaningful deliberative processes. 
Your committee concluded that two 
particularly clear manifestations of     
excessive partisanship are apparent in 
the Legislature. 
First, the majority 
has the power to 
use the rules to re-
duce the minority’s 
involvement in the 
legislative process. 
This is excessive 
partisanship in 
its clearest form. 
Second, the powers 
that come with the 
leadership offices 
in the Legislature 
reinforce the incen-
tive for each party to seek and main-
tain majority status. Your committee 
examined these two manifestations of 
partisanship and considered legislative 
rule changes that might at least dispel 
legislaTive rUles, leadersHiP  
and nonParTisan sTaff
“leaders of both parties 
– while they enjoy their 
majority status – have 
regularly chosen to interpret 
legislative rules in their own 
favor or to modify them 
through simple-majority 
vote in order to consolidate 
power and to exert partisan 
control over committee 
assignments and the 
movement of legislation.”
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the temptation for the majority to abuse 
its power at the expense of the minority. 
Background
As stated earlier in this report, in Or-
egon, the members of a particular house 
choose the presiding officer of that 
house: the President of the Senate and 
the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives. The majority and minority party 
members meet in caucus to coordinate 
their votes for the leaders. The majority 
party members can also change their 
leaders if they are displeased with their 
performance. For example, at the begin-
ning of the 1999 session, the Republican 
caucus removed the sitting Speaker, 
Lynn Lundquist, because he had been 
too supportive of Democratic legisla-
tion.15
The President and the Speaker enjoy 
tremendous discretionary power and 
typically demand that their party 
members support them 100 percent of 
the time on procedural 
votes. Therefore, these 
leaders have considerable 
discretion to change the 
rules to strengthen their 
control. As mentioned 
above, changing the rules 
of the legislative bodies 
requires only a simple-
majority vote.
The most important 
powers of the presiding 
officers relate to commit-
tees. The presiding officer 
determines the number of committees, 
selects the committee chairs, appoints 
members to committees and assigns 
bills to committees for consideration. 
As Oregon’s Legislature has a strong 
committee system compared to other 
legislatures, this system ensures that 
presiding officers will have extraor-
dinary authority over the legislative 
process.
The bulk of legislative work occurs in 
committees. In either the House or 
the Senate, the committee chair may 
schedule meetings on bills, and a major-
ity of committee members may make 
a formal request for a work session or 
hearing on a bill to the committee chair. 
Bills may be reported out of committee 
either with or without minority reports, 
and the rules provide a means for        
amendments to be made. Bills reported 
out of committee ultimately go to the 
floor for a vote.
Powers granted by the rules and options 
for the presiding officers to use these 
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powers can vary between the House 
and the Senate. Many witnesses were 
of the opinion that the Speaker wielded 
too much power over the agenda in the 
House in 2005, particularly in regard to 
committee appointments and the rout-
ing of bills to those committees. How-
ever, according to Representative Sal 
Esquivel, then-Speaker Minnis’ efforts 
to incorporate members of the minority 
were not appreciated in her first session 
as Speaker of the House; when she tried 
to appoint Democrats to subcommittee 
chairs, the Democratic leadership would 
not cooperate. Some witnesses also 
acknowledged that more control might 
be appropriate in the House because 
of important differences between the 
House and Senate. Judy Hall, Secretary 
of the Senate, quoted Senate President 
Peter Courtney’s characterization of 
the House as a “barroom brawl” and the 
Senate as a “church.” Because it is twice 
as large, the House is more difficult to 
organize; greater efforts are required to 
move the agenda forward. Since Sena-
tors serve longer terms, and many have 
had experience as representatives in the 
House, the Senate requires less organi-
zation because of the greater experience 
of its members and stronger relation-
ships among them.
Some witnesses spoke in favor of strong 
leader control in both houses, arguing 
that it is inefficient to do everything 
by committee in a citizen legislature. 
Those witnesses placed great reliance 
on the character and leadership skills 
of the presiding officers and reasoned 
that poor leaders would be voted out. 
Other witnesses, however, argued that 
a strong presiding officer system makes 
it too easy to exclude the minority from 
any meaningful participation, and noted 
that there will always be partisan pres-
sures to do exactly that.
Members of the minority have some 
limited rights even in the face of the 
majority’s determination to exclude mi-
nority participation. Minority members 
have the right to debate any measure 
on the floor. They also have the power 
to propose amendments in committee. 
In addition, if they do not support a bill 
that has been approved by the com-
mittee and sent to the floor for a vote, 
they may file a minority report to be 
considered on the floor along with the 
approved bill. Often minority reports 
are filed to make a political statement or 
to force the majority party members to 
take a position on an issue, but some-
times minority reports gain serious con-
sideration and even pass. However, these 
minority rights, which are conferred 
only through legislative rules, can be 
changed by a simple-majority vote of the 
legislative house. For example, at the be-
ginning of the 2008 special session, the 
Democratic majority adopted rules on a 
party-line vote that prohibited the filing 
of minority reports unless a majority of 
House members signed on to the report. 
Republican lawmakers argued that such 
a rule essentially eliminated their right 
to have alternative legislation considered 
on the House floor.
The minority generally does not possess 
the right to force consideration of a bill, 
either in committee or on the floor. This 
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right belongs exclusively to the major-
ity. The Legislature traditionally has 
maintained rules allowing a majority of 
legislators, from either party, to call for 
a vote on a bill without the agreement of 
the presiding officer. In the House this 
rule is called the “Rule of 31,” because 31 
votes constitute a majority. At the very 
end of the 2005 legislative session, how-
ever, this rule was changed so that only 
the presiding officer could bring a bill 
to the floor for a vote. The Democratic 
members of the 
House, who were in 
the minority at the 
time, opposed the 
measure and argued 
that the purpose 
for the rule change 
was to prevent the House from debating 
and voting on the Senate-passed civil 
unions bill. Then-Speaker Minnis dis-
agreed, stating that the reason for the 
change was to prevent House members 
from wasting time by bringing bills to 
the floor that had little or no chance of 
passage simply for political purposes. 
At the beginning of the 2007 session, 
the House voted to restore the Rule of 
31. Six bills were pulled from commit-
tee and considered on the House floor 
pursuant to this rule during the 2007 
session.
The power of the leadership to control 
the agenda is complicated when differ-
ent parties control the Senate and the 
House. This situation can lead either 
to bipartisan cooperation or partisan 
stalemate, with each house rejecting 
bills passed by the other house. Several 
witnesses noted that during recent 
sessions, when party control was split 
between the two houses, House and 
Senate leaders were forced to work 
together in order to pass a budget and 
other priority legislation. On the other 
hand, some witnesses reported that the 
presiding officers at times would refuse 
to consider legislation passed by the 
other assembly — even bills that would 
have been supported by a majority of 
members — a practice that will be dis-





have been misused 
by leadership of 
both parties for excessively partisan 
purposes, that the powers of majority 
control are so great that party leaders 
become overly focused on maintaining 
or achieving power in the next election, 
and that this focus interferes with the 
cooperation and compromise often nec-
essary for good public policy. Rules that 
guarantee meaningful participation for 
members of the minority party should 
be in place. Your committee found the 
most partisan legislative maneuvering 
in two areas: committee assignments 
and the assignment of particular bills 
to committees. Rules that restore more 
rationality and less gamesmanship to 
committee assignments and that limit 
some of leadership’s power over assign-
ment of bills to committees could help 
to alleviate the excessively partisan 
atmosphere. Your committee also found, 
as discussed further below, that having 
professional nonpartisan staff serving 
“rules that guarantee 
meaningful participation for 
members of the minority 
party should be in place.”
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the legislative body contributes to an 
environment where greater collabora-
tion is likely to occur. 
The PCOL noted many of the same 
concerns, concluding that “some rules 
and practices of the Legislature promote 
excessive partisanship and prevent 
problems from being addressed effi-
ciently and effectively.” The PCOL urged 
that the rules of the House and Senate 
not be used to prevent consideration of 
significant policy issues and exhorted 
presiding officers to represent the body 
as a whole and not to use their authority 
to prevent debate on policy matters. It 
also encouraged majority and minority 
leaders to develop a more collaborative 
environment for discussing legislative 
priorities and establish collaborative 
processes that include the minority in 
session management. (See Appendix D.)
Your committee considered the best 
manner to implement legislative rules 
that might in turn foster such a col-
laborative environment and process. The 
current manner of legislative rule-mak-
ing is clearly flawed, as it is possible for 
the Legislature to make changes to the 
rules with very little deliberation and by 
mere simple-majority vote.
One alternative — transforming all 
rules into statutes — also has its 
drawbacks. While there are numer-
ous legislative processes incorporated 
into statute,* your committee and 
witnesses were resistant to the idea of 
*  For example, ORS 171.555 creates the 
Joint Ways and Means Committee, sets out the 
means for establishing the committee’s mem-
bership, and identifies many of the procedures 
for the committee.
incorporating all rules into statutes. The 
concern was that if rules were made into 
statutes, the Governor could veto sub-
sequent legislation designed to change 
a rule, raising legitimate questions of 
separation of powers.
Your committee thus reached a compro-
mise recommendation: the Legislature 
should incorporate into statute certain 
language relating to how rules would 
be created, changed (e.g. by simple or 
super-majority vote) or superseded. 
Your committee also decided that rules 
protecting the minority’s rights of 
participation should require a super-
majority to change.
Control of Committee  
assignments
As has been noted, Oregon’s legislative 
presiding officers have discretionary 
power over all committee assignments. 
A key assignment is the position of 
committee chair. Committee chairs 
have considerable authority to adopt 
procedural rules and decide which 
proposed bills will be considered by the 
committee. In Oregon’s strong com-
mittee system, the chairs direct much 
of the legislative process. Although 
the House Speaker and Senate Presi-
dent do not directly control committee 
process, committee chairs serve at the 
pleasure of the presiding officers. Also, 
the presiding officers decide which bills 
to assign to which committees, giving 
them considerable influence over the 
flow of legislation.
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Oregon’s committee assignment process 
differs from the process in the U.S. Con-
gress in a way that gives presiding of-
ficers in the state Legislature far greater 
power. In the U.S. Congress all legisla-
tors, including members of the minority, 
once appointed to a particular standing 
committee, have a proprietary right to 
their committee positions and can move 
up the ranks through seniority. No such 
right exists in the Oregon Legislature, 
where presiding officers have near 
complete author-
ity over committee 
assignments. As a 
result, the Oregon 
system can lead to 
a loss of expertise 
on committees 
if someone or 
some party falls 
out of favor and 
the experienced 
members of the 
committee are 
reassigned. In the 
2005 session in the House, the Speaker 
made all committee assignments, usu-
ally without conferring with minority 
leadership. A more equitable state of 
affairs existed in the Senate, where the 
President consulted the minority leader-
ship about committee appointments 
and ensured that all appointments, 
including those to the important Ways 
and Means Committee and the Emer-
gency Board, were proportional. In the 
House, by contrast, committee com-
position was not always proportional. 
For example, during the 2005 session, 
when the House had 34 Republicans 
and 26 Democrats, the Speaker assigned 
seven House Republicans and only three 
House Democrats to the Joint Ways and 
Means Committee and six House Repub-
licans and only two House Democrats to 
the Emergency Board.16
Besides resulting in a loss of propor-
tional party equity on committees, such 
arbitrary committee assignments fre-
quently rob committees, and ultimately 
the Legislature itself, of considerable 
expertise. Several witnesses complained 








training are not as-
signed to commit-




noted, for example, that Representative 
Alan Bates, a Democrat from Ashland 
and a physician with the expertise and 
the desire to work on health policy, was 
not assigned to the committee that 
dealt with health matters while he was 
in the minority party.
The House Speaker has not always made 
committee appointments unilaterally. 
Sal Esquivel noted that when Hardy 
Myers served as Speaker of the House 
from 1979 to 1983, he established rules 
that committee membership would 
be proportional and that the party 
members would select the specific com-
“[i]n the oregon legislature, 
where presiding officers have 
near complete authority over 
committee assignments. as 
a result, the oregon system 
can lead to a loss of expertise 
on committees if someone 
or some party falls out of 
favor and the experienced 
members of the committee 
are reassigned.”
City Club of Portland
24
Bridging the ParTisan divide
25
mittee members so that the Speaker 
would have no role in choosing minority 
members of committees. In the past, 
the minority party also had the right to 
name vice-chairs of committees. Former 
Speaker Vera Katz, however, altered 
the committee assignment process in a 
way that exhibited excessive partisan-
ship. When she presided as Speaker, she 
personally made all committee assign-
ments, even for the minority party. The 
change benefited the Democrats for the 
two sessions Katz served as Speaker, 
but then gave Republicans the same 
advantage when they took majority 
control of the House. This example illus-
trates how the manipulation of power 
by the majority party often leads to the 
same manipulation when the minority 
becomes the majority.
As legislative processes are inherently 
partisan, finding a way to meld partisan 
maneuvering with the obligations of ef-
fective lawmaking will always be a chal-
lenge. A minority party, for example, 
may be best served politically by being 
perceived as having little say in legisla-
tion that the minority does not support 
and believes is not in its best political 
interests. By contrast, a process that 
allows the minority party to have some 
influence creates real opportunities for 
meaningful contribution to legislation. 
Your committee believes that active and 
constructive participation is a respon-
sibility of elected office. In the balance 
between political posturing and effec-
tive legislative process, your committee 
found value in having majority and mi-
nority members constructively engaged 
in the work of committees. 
Your committee concluded that com-
mittee assignments have increasingly 
become political tools that both parties 
have used to their advantage. Because 
the committee structure is so critical to 
the legislative process, the manipula-
tion of the rules surrounding commit-
tee assignments for political purposes 
has heightened the sense of excessive 
partisanship in the Legislature and 
discouraged bipartisan cooperation. 
Restoring the prior rules on committee 
assignments could help alleviate these 
problems. Members of the minority 
should be given the opportunity to 
contribute in a meaningful way to delib-
erating legislation. The House in 2007 
took a significant step in this direction 
by restoring the rule that all committee 
appointments must be made propor-
tionally. Your committee recommends 
that legislative rules in both houses be 
amended to require proportional repre-
sentation of party members on commit-
tees, as the rules of the House presently 
require. Your committee also agrees 
with the PCOL’s specific recommenda-
tion that the Legislature adopt rules to 
“empower leadership of the minority 
party to select minority representa-
tives on legislative committees” and to 
“require that Vice-Chairs of legislative 
committees be from minority parties.” 
(See Appendix D.) Finally, your com-
mittee recommends that the legislative 
leadership take into account experience, 
interest, and seniority in determining 
committee assignments.
City Club of Portland
26
Bridging the ParTisan divide
27
Control of legislation
Besides deciding the number, member-
ship and leadership of committees, the 
presiding officers also have considerable 
power over the movement of bills into 
and out of committee. First, the presid-
ing officer appoints the members of the 
committees as well as the chairs and 
vice-chairs. Second, although the rules 
of each legislative body require that the 
presiding officer refer each bill or mea-
sure to a committee 
within seven days 
of its first read-
ing, the presiding 
officers are free to 
decide to which 
committee the bills 
or measures will 
be assigned. Third, 
subject to a major-
ity of the committee’s request that a bill 
or measure be acted upon, the presiding 
officers can pressure committee chairs 
to give hearings to, or bring to the floor, 
the bills favored by the leadership. 
Finally, the President of the Senate is 
an ex-officio member of each commit-
tee with the right to vote. Clearly, the 
authority of presiding officers can be 
used in excessively partisan ways to 
prevent bills sponsored by members of 
the minority party from being passed or 
even debated.
Caucuses also have considerable sway 
over the committee process. Duncan 
Wyse, who has worked with the Legisla-
ture as president of the Oregon Business 
Council since 1995, noted that, over 
the last ten to fifteen years, there has 
been a shift of power from committees 
to caucuses. At one time, “you would 
go before a committee and feel that if 
convinced, the committee could get the 
bill through, thus it was worth spending 
time testifying and educating them.” 
Troy Nichols, chief of staff to Speaker 
Minnis during the 2005 session, linked 
the rise in caucus activity to the period 
of term limits. Recently, the unspo-
ken rule has been that a bill must have 
the support of the majority of the ma-
jority caucus before 
it can come to the 
floor. Wyse cited 
his own experience 
with the sunset 
renewal of the 
Oregon Progress 
Board, which passed 
out of committee 
unanimously but did not get to the floor 
because it did not have the support of 
the majority of the Republican caucus. 
He noted that the effect of caucus deci-
sion on bills meant that a minority of 
the body — a majority of the majority 
caucus, which could amount to only 26 
percent of the legislators — has dis-
proportionate power. As noted above, 
the reinstitution of the Rule of 31 in 
the House should alleviate some of the 
problems noted by Wyse and others.
The PCOL recommended that the 
Legislature adopt rules to allow mea-
sures with demonstrable evidence of a 
majority of members of the chamber in 
support to move to the floor for debate 
and vote. (See Appendix D.) 
“[T]he authority of presiding 
officers can be used in 
excessively partisan ways 
to prevent bills sponsored 
by members of the minority 
party from being passed or 
even debated.”
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Following the release of the PCOL re-
port in 2006, Republican Representative 
Sal Esquivel and Democratic Represen-
tative Peter Buckley drafted rules that 
were adopted by the Oregon House of 
Representatives as the “Teamwork Bill.” 
The new rules entitle each House mem-
ber to have a hearing and work session 
for two bills so long as the member can 
obtain two chief co-sponsors from each 
party.17 Seven bills were designated as 
teamwork bills during the 2007 session.
Your committee 
agreed with the 
analysis underly-
ing the PCOL’s 
recommendation 
— that the strong 
control exercised 
by leadership over 
legislation prevents 
important policy 
issues from being 
aired and obstructs 
passage of good 
laws that would 
be widely supported. Your committee 
also applauds the House for passing 
the Teamwork Bill. Your committee 
proposes additional specific recommen-
dations to provide a check on the leader-
ship’s power. First, the House and the 
Senate should adopt and maintain rules 
allowing each member of the Legislature 
to require a committee hearing on a pre-
determined and limited number of bills 
each legislative session. Second, the Sen-
ate should follow the House’s lead and 
adopt and maintain rules, similar to the 
Rule of 31, which permit a majority of 
members, regardless of party affiliation, 
to require a committee or floor hearing 
on a bill. Third, the House and Senate 
should adopt and maintain rules per-
mitting a substantial minority of each of 
their members to require a committee 
or floor hearing on a bill that has already 
been passed by the other chamber.
nonpartisan staff
Presiding officers, committee chairs 
and majority caucuses also exert power 
over legislative processes through their 
control of staff 
resources. The 
most important 
staff positions are 
the Secretary of 
the Senate and the 
Chief Clerk of the 
House. They keep 
official records, 
advise the presiding 
officers and mem-
bers on parliamen-
tary procedure, and 
oversee a number of employees. Both of 
these positions are elected by a major-
ity of votes from each chamber. The two 
current officers have both been in place 
for several sessions. While they each 
serve all the members of their chamber, 
they work most closely with the presid-
ing officers.
In the 2005 Session Speaker Karen Min-
nis proposed a rule change that would 
have given the Speaker the sole power 
to hire and fire the Chief Clerk, but 
she faced resistance from the major-
ity caucus. A modified rule change was 
adopted, giving the Speaker the power 
“staff have a duty to 
serve all legislators, but 
committee staff report to 
the committee chair. as 
a result, minority party 
members sometimes have 
difficulties getting staff 
support and are hampered 
in their ability to craft 
legislation for committee 
consideration.” 
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to terminate the Chief Clerk but requir-
ing the full chamber to elect a successor. 
This event highlighted the tension be-
tween serving the entire legislative body 
and serving the majority leadership. In 
2007 the House restored the rule which 
places the right to hire or terminate the 
Chief Clerk with the membership of the 
House and not just the Speaker.
Committee members depend on the 
policy work of staff members who 
provide analysis for committees. Staff 
have a duty to serve all legislators, but 
committee staff report to the committee 
chair. As a result, minority party mem-
bers sometimes have difficulties getting 
staff support and are hampered in their 
ability to craft legislation for committee 
consideration. The PCOL recommended 
that the Legislature professionalize 
issue-area staff to make them more ac-
cessible to all members. (See Appendix 
D.)
Your committee found that staff re-
sources are unreasonably and unevenly 
distributed between the majority and 
minority parties and, therefore, their 
ability to analyze and propose meaning-
ful legislation varies accordingly. Your 
committee agrees with the PCOL and 
recommends that administrative officers 
and committee staff in the Legislature 
be nonpartisan professionals serving 
members of both parties; they should 
not serve at the sole discretion of the 
majority party. 
Chapter Conclusions
Because of the structure of Oregon’s  ➤
Legislature, which is character-
ized by a strong-leader system, the 
leaders have tremendous discretion 
and set the tone for partisanship or 
collaboration.
As most of Oregon’s legislative rules  ➤
are subject to revision by simple-
majority vote, they can be — and 
have been — easily manipulated to 
satisfy the immediate demands of 
the majority party in a particular 
house.
Oregon’s legislative rules grant its  ➤
presiding officers generous powers 
that they can easily use to control 
both committee assignments and 
the movement of legislation in a 
way that demands loyalty from 
majority party members and that 
excludes members of the minority 
party from a meaningful role in the 
legislative process. 
The strong leader system fosters  ➤
excessive partisanship by reward-
ing a winner-take-all approach to 
controlling the Senate and House of 
Representatives.
Ostensibly nonpartisan administra- ➤
tive staff officers are subject to the 
imperatives of the party in control 
of a particular house.
While committees remain impor- ➤
tant in the Legislature, their power 
has somewhat diminished because 
of the increasing power of the 
caucuses. 
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The House and Senate should adopt  ➤
and maintain rules that establish 
proportional representation of 
party members on committees and 
permit the leaders of each caucus to 
determine which of its members to 
appoint to committees. When mak-
ing committee assignments, caucus 
leaders should take into account 
the experience, interest and senior-
ity of legislators. 
The House and Senate should adopt  ➤
and maintain rules that require the 
vice-chair of each committee to be a 
member of the minority party, and 
committee chairs should consult 
with vice-chairs in developing com-
mittee agendas.
While the House’s Teamwork Bill  ➤
is a step in the right direction, the 
House and Senate should adopt 
and maintain rules that allow 
each member of the Legislature to 
require a committee hearing on a 
predetermined number of bills dur-
ing each legislative session. 
The House should maintain and the  ➤
Senate should adopt rules permit-
ting a majority of each of their 
members to require a committee or 
floor hearing on a bill. In addition, 
the House and Senate should adopt 
and maintain rules permitting a 
substantial minority of each of 
their members to require a com-
mittee or floor hearing on a bill 
that has already been passed by the 
other chamber.
The House should maintain and the  ➤
Senate should adopt rules ensuring 
that the Secretary of the Senate 
and the Chief Clerk of the House 
are nonpartisan and serve members 
of both parties, and not serve at 
the sole discretion of the presiding 
officers. In addition, the House and 
Senate should employ permanent 
staff with knowledge of substantive 
policy areas to support the work of 
committees.
Once the above rules are adopted,  ➤
the House and Senate should 
require a supermajority to change 
these and other rules that protect 
each member’s right to participate 
in the legislative process.
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The importance of  
relationships and Civility in 
legislative deliberation
The Oregon Legislature works best when 
individual legislators have personal 
and respectful relationships with each 
other. A number of witnesses testified 
that they believe those legislators who 
know each other well and who respect 
one another are more likely to work 
together courteously and effectively. 
Similarly, witnesses expressed the 
opinion, and your committee concurred, 
that courtesy and good relationships be-
tween legislators contribute to positive 
deliberation. 
Witnesses suggested that the Senate 
generally fosters better relationships 
between individual legislators than the 
House for the reasons also discussed in 
the previous chapter. Because the Sen-
ate is smaller and senators serve longer 
terms, they tend to get to know each 
other better. Senators also typically pos-
sess more experience, as many of them 
served in the House before coming to 
the Senate. In addition, senators are less 
likely to be excessively partisan than 
representatives because senators are 
elected from larger districts and must 
therefore appeal to a greater variety of 
people.
There are instructive examples of how 
legislators, particularly those from the 
same geographic area, have been able to 
put aside partisan concerns to work for 
the common good of constituents. Rep-
resentative Sal Esquivel, a self-described 
“moderate Republican,” commented that 
he and Representative Peter Buckley, a 
Democrat, were able to develop strate-
gies for working together to promote 
common interests. Esquivel and Buck-
ley, for example, drafted rules that were 
later adopted to ensure that each House 
member is able to bring forth at least 
two bills and have those bills debated 
in committee, regardless which party 
is in power, so long as each bill has two 
sponsors from each party, as discussed 
previously.
A number of witnesses commented that 
the governor has an important part to 
legislaTor relaTionsHiPs  
and CiviliTY
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play in alleviating excessive partisan-
ship. Witnesses commented on the 
styles of recent governors and noted 
that some styles may be more effective 
than others in mitigating the negative 
consequences of partisanship. Lobby-
ist Dave Barrows pointed to Governor 
Neil Goldschmidt as an example of a 
governor who played a useful role in 
combating excessive partisanship. Al-
though he lacked legislative experience 
prior to becoming governor, he quickly 
learned the importance of consulting 
the legislative leadership soon after call-
ing a special session without having had 
such a consultation. After that experi-
ence, Governor Goldschmidt made a 
practice of casually visiting legislators 
in their offices, regardless of their party 
affiliation, in order to get to know them 
personally. His close relationships with 
these legislators eventually worked to 
help facilitate passage of legislation that 
he supported.
Former legislative staffer and current 
member of the lobby, Pat McCormick, 
considered Republican Governor Victor 
Atiyeh the best governor with whom he 
had ever worked, in large part because 
the governor met weekly with the ma-
jority and minority leadership of both 
houses and maintained an open door 
to any legislator who wished to discuss 
matters with him.
Several observers noted favorably that 
Governor Kulongoski made a greater 
effort to build relationships across party 
lines during the 2007 session than in 
the 2005 session. One lobby newsletter 
noted that he “weighed in judiciously on 
his list of priorities, as well as played a 
key role in brokering compromises when 
needed.”
The Experiment with Term 
Limits 
Witnesses pointed to the imposition of 
term limits in 1992 as a factor that has 
prevented many legislators from devel-
oping lasting and positive relationships. 
Oregon voters approved legislative term 
limits in 1992. The Oregon Supreme 
Court later ruled in 2002 that the ballot 
measure establishing term limits was 
unconstitutional in the way it was draft-
ed.18 Although term limits have been 
abolished now for several years, many 
witnesses felt that their negative effects 
carried over into recent sessions.
Without exception, all witnesses who 
commented on term limits agreed that 
the period of term limits contributed to 
excessive partisanship. The imposition 
of limits meant that the most experi-
enced legislators in the House served a 
mere four years. Sal Esquivel, a Republi-
can member of the House who repre-
sents the Medford area, pointed out 
that term limits led to a dramatic loss of 
institutional memory among legislators. 
This loss of institutional memory meant 
that inevitably inexperienced legisla-
tors were forced to rely heavily on party 
caucuses and lobbyists for information 
about policy matters and legislative 
process. As a result, legislators were less 
able to develop well-founded and inde-
pendent proposals on various subjects.
Furthermore, because legislators were 
less familiar with legislative processes, 
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they often tried to force proposals 
through the Legislature in a way that 
merely produced gridlock. Mark Sim-
mons, the Republican Speaker of the 
House in 2001, concurred with Esquivel. 
Although he said he voted for the limits 
in 1992, he was glad when Oregon 
courts ruled them unconstitutional a 
decade later: “I saw that term limits take 
power from the elected legislators and 
give it to the lobby and the bureaucrats 
— the people in the building with all the 
experience.”19 Simmons added that term 
limits also prevented legislators from 
gaining the experience often required 
for genuine leadership. “Under term 
limits,” noted Simmons, “nobody can be 
really ready to be Speaker.” 
Oregon’s Citizen Legislature
Some witnesses pointed to the very ex-
istence of Oregon’s “citizen legislature” 
itself as an engine of excessive partisan-
ship. In a “citizen legislature,” legislators 
convene for a few months every year 
or two and are expected to keep their 
outside jobs and support themselves 
primarily from outside income. By 
contrast, in a professional legislature, 
legislators are paid a salary to work 
year-round and are expected to give up 
outside jobs when elected. Even setting 
aside the effects of term limits, many 
witnesses claimed that there are too 
many “amateurs” in Oregon’s Legisla-
ture who are overly reliant on lobbyists 
and special interests. Pointing out the 
enormous and expanding responsibili-
ties of the Legislature, they questioned 
whether the state’s citizen Legislature, 
as opposed to a professional legislature, 
can cope with the intricacies and growth 
of the state budget and with the increas-
ing length of the sessions. 
The deterioration of  
relationships among  
legislators
Many witnesses voiced the opinion that 
there has been an unraveling of personal 
relationships in the Legislature, which 
has affected the Legislature’s ability to 
deliberate on major issues. Witnesses 
identified a number of contributing fac-
tors in addition to term limits, some of 
which were discussed in the first part of 
this report: uncompromising ideologies 
that have become more widespread both 
in the public and among politicians; the 
influence of a national political culture 
that brands members of the oppos-
ing party as enemies; and sociological 
changes in Oregon that have created a 
divide between urban and rural popula-
tions. Additional societal factors were 
also mentioned, including a general 
decline in civility and greater diversity 
in the people who serve as legislators.
Some witnesses pointed to the chang-
ing lifestyles of legislators, with more 
of them interested in being at home 
with their families than socializing 
with fellow legislators. Former Senator 
Mike Thorne noted: “I can recall getting 
together in the evening with people I 
had gone head-to-head with that day. 
The next day we might be together on 
another subject.” Since legislators tend 
to socialize less during the session now, 
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they rarely develop the same level of re-
spect and understanding that members 
shared in the past. Several witnesses 
even pointed to changes in the physical 
structure of the Capitol in Salem as hav-
ing adversely impacted the development 
of strong personal relationships among 
legislators. Before the addition of the 
Capitol wings, legislators did not have 
separate offices, but worked from their 
desks on the House and Senate floors 
where they constantly interacted. In the 
new wings, legislators are isolated in 
their own offices and much less interac-
tion occurs across party lines. Political 
writer Juliet Eilperin notes the same 
trend in Congress where fewer House 
members move their families to Wash-
ington, D.C., instead spending as short 
a week as possible in the capitol and 
returning home for extended weekends, 
a trend which she suggests has “made 
it more difficult for House members to 
understand each other and their dif-
fering points of view.”  Eilperin quotes 
U.S. Representative Barney Frank as 
commenting that even the tables in the 
lunchroom are divided by party.20
Numerous witnesses argued that nega-
tive campaigns make it hard for legisla-
tors to form relationships with mem-
bers of the opposite party once they get 
into office. Other witnesses noted that 
normal tensions arising from campaign-
ing are exacerbated by the intensity, fre-
quency and duration of campaigns. One 
witness pointed out that members of 
the House are almost always campaign-
ing because they have only two-year 
terms, thereby constantly stoking the 
fires of excessive partisanship.
There were also examples of caucus 
leaders discouraging efforts to build 
relationships between Democrats and 
Republicans in the Oregon Legislature. 
A few years ago, a number of fresh-
man legislators developed a bipartisan 
freshman caucus after attending a pre-
session conference together. Their inten-
tion was to work together to develop 
positive relationships and gain valuable 
expertise. The legislative leadership, 
however, strongly disapproved of this 
caucus. When the staff tried to repeat 
the conference for freshman legislators 
before the next session, the leadership 
quashed the idea.
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Your committee concluded that poor 
working relationships have contributed 
to the Legislature’s inability to ad-
dress critical and pressing issues facing 
Oregon. In addition, many witnesses re-
inforced the conclusion that Oregonians 
tend to believe that legislators cannot 
work well together, which may have the 
effect of causing the public to become 
disengaged from politics. For all of these 
reasons, your committee concluded that 
potential solutions should be considered 
to remedy this lack 
of civility in the 
Legislature.




tee considered a 
number of reforms 
that might reduce 
the excesses of 
partisanship and 
strengthen positive 
working relationships within the Leg-
islature. These potential solutions are 
described below.
Longer Terms for Legislators
Several witnesses supported longer 
terms for legislators. Former Oregon 
Supreme Court Judge Hans Linde, also a 
member of PCOL, noted the advantages 
of six-year terms in the U.S. Senate, 
which gives senators time to build 
relationships and accept the obligations 
of statesmanship. Short terms, he said, 
are not “good personnel policy and not 
a good investment.” “It takes time,” he 
added, “to figure out how government 
works.” In other words, legislators 
would benefit from greater expertise 
and institutional knowledge. Longtime 
professional staff in the Oregon House 
of Representatives agreed, noting 
that in each session, they work with a 
different body of members, making it 
difficult to establish long-term working 
relationships: “You get to know them 
and then they go home.” Exacerbating 
the problem is the 
two-year election 




every two years are 
forced to campaign 
perpetually to en-
hance the likelihood 
of reelection. This 
constant campaign-
ing increases their 
dependence on 
interest groups, de-
creases time spent 
on legislative work, and diminishes 
cooperation often necessary to achieve 
results.
Your committee therefore recommends 
extending legislative terms in the House 
to four years and extending legislative 
terms in the Senate to six years.
Annual Legislative Sessions of 
Limited Length 
Several witnesses, including former 
state legislators Eileen Qutub and Max 
“representatives seeking 
reelection every two years 
are forced to campaign 
perpetually to enhance the 
likelihood of reelection. 
This constant campaigning 
increases their dependence 
on interest groups, 
decreases time spent on 
legislative work, and 
diminishes cooperation 
often necessary to achieve 
results.”
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Williams, both Republicans, suggested 
that meeting every year — as opposed 
to every other year — would allow 
legislators to develop policy and insti-
tutional expertise and would promote 
better working relationships. While 
some witnesses thought annual sessions 
would eliminate too many potential 
legislative candidates from the process 
because of the increased time demands, 
this concern could be ameliorated by 
limiting session length. Under such a 
proposal, the Legislature would have a 
regular session during odd years and a 
short budget session in even years. The 
PCOL recommended that the Legisla-
ture experiment with annual sessions by 
convening both in 2007 and 2008, then 
deciding whether to institute annual 
sessions permanently. (See Appendix D.) 
The Legislature has acted on this recom-
mendation and held a limited session in 
February 2008.
Your committee recommends amending 
the Oregon Constitution to allow for an-
nual sessions of prescribed length. 
Change in Timing of Session
Ramona Kenady, who has served as 
Chief Clerk of the House since 1985, 
suggested shifting the start date of 
the session from January to March. 
The extra time would give legislators a 
cooling-off period after inherently par-
tisan campaigns, as well as more time to 
prepare for the session. This additional 
period would also permit legislators to 
receive more training and get to know 
each other better. Witnesses specifically 
recommended a March date because 
the state Office of Economic Analysis 
releases revenue projections on March 
1.* Much of the Legislature’s important 
business awaits that information.
The PCOL recommended that the 
Legislature establish a new date for the 
beginning of the legislative session. (See 
Appendix D.) Your committee specifi-
cally recommends that the session begin 
in March. 
Improved Training and 
Relationship-Building for 
Legislators
Many of your committee’s witnesses 
recommended pre-session conferences 
and retreats as a way for legislators to 
get to know one another better. In the 
past, they noted, such gatherings helped 
build collegiality and trust. Professional 
legislative staff, including Chief Clerk 
of the House Ramona Kenady and Sec-
retary of the Senate Judy Hall, were the 
strongest advocates for such pre-session 
conferences and retreats. They argued 
that better orientation and socialization 
before the session helped legislators 
gain a deeper understanding of each 
other and each other’s issues. Those 
witnesses pointed out that a pre-session 
conference would also allow the two 
houses to facilitate the upcoming ses-
sion by electing their leaders, appoint-
ing committees and educating members 
*  The Legislature also receives information 
throughout the session about the fiscal impact 
of proposed legislation from staff members in 
the Legislative Fiscal Office and the Legislative 
Revenue Office.
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on both the legislative process and the 
key issues. The PCOL similarly recom-
mended that the Legislature enhance 
legislator orientation curriculum to 
include more training in subject matter 
and procedural areas. (See Appendix 
D.) A pre-session conference would also 
provide an opportunity for the Ways 
and Means Committee to examine the 
budget and the economic forecast care-
fully before the session begins.
Your committee recommends that both 
legislative houses organize annual pre-
session conference retreats to promote 
positive legislative relationships and to 
prepare for the subsequent legislative 
session.
Increased Salaries for Legislators
A wide cross-section of your commit-
tee’s witnesses supported increased 
salaries for legislators. Judy Hall, Secre-
tary of the Senate, said that legislators 
should earn a decent salary, and noted 
they make far less than they should con-
sidering the work they do and the hours 
they work. Members of the Legislature 
are compensated $19,884 per year, plus 
$109 per day they are in session.21 Since 
the average odd-year regular session 
lasts about six months and even-year 
special sessions appear to last about 20 
days, each member receives approxi-
mately $34,000 during odd years and 
$22,000 during even years. This aver-
ages out to $28,000 per year.  
The PCOL specifically recommended 
that salaries for state elected officials, 
including legislators, be set by an 
independent commission at a level that 
attracts well-qualified candidates. (See 
Appendix D.) 
Your committee considered the argu-
ment that low salaries might discour-
age otherwise competent people from 
running for office and that increased sal-
aries would broaden the pool of people 
willing and interested in becoming 
legislators. Furthermore, your commit-
tee also considered the argument that a 
significant increase in salary might send 
the message that the public expects the 
Legislature to act in a more professional 
manner. Nevertheless, your committee 
concluded that it could neither make 
nor rule out a connection between sal-
ary and excessive partisanship.
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Chapter Conclusions
Courteous and extensive working  ➤
relationships among experienced 
legislators contribute to good 
deliberation.
The Legislature has experienced an  ➤
unraveling of relationships, which 
has inhibited its ability to function 
well as a deliberative body.
Chapter 
recommendations
The Legislature should refer to  ➤
voters a constitutional amendment 
that would establish four-year 
terms for members of the House of 
Representatives and six-year terms 
for members of the Senate.
The Legislature should refer to  ➤
voters a constitutional amendment 
that would establish annual legisla-
tive sessions of limited length, com-
mencing in March, shortly after the 
state Office of Economic Analysis 
releases its first revenue projections 
for the year.
The Legislature should hold pre- ➤
session conference retreats to 
provide more training and more op-
portunities for legislators to forge 
productive professional relation-
ships across party lines.
City Club of Portland
38
Bridging the ParTisan divide
39
who want to run as independents and 
who may be less beholden to partisan 
interest groups also face an uphill battle 
because of the risk that voters will con-
sider them “spoilers.” Voters who would 
ideally prefer to support such candi-
dates frequently choose not to do so for 
fear of tipping the election toward the 
major-party candidate they like least.
In addition, in districts where one party 
has a “safe” majority, elections are 
essentially decided in the primary, leav-
ing members of the other major party 
and independents (about 21 percent 
of Oregon voters) without a meaning-
ful vote.22 During the redistricting 
process, competitive districts can be 
transformed into safe districts for the 
benefit of incumbents and the party in 
power. When the state is divided into 
many safe districts, winning candidates 
tend to be more partisan, as successful 
candidates appeal to partisan voters in 
the primary election rather than appeal-
ing to a mix of partisan, independent, 
and cross-over voters in the general 
election. As a result, staunch conser-
eXCessive ParTisansHiP in  
CaMPaigns and eleCTions
Your committee recognized that politi-
cal campaigns are inherently partisan. 
Competition between parties highlights 
major issues, excites public interest, and 
provides voters with clear policy alterna-
tives. No election system is perfect and 
each involves trade offs. While your 
committee heard numerous criticisms 
about how the current system frequent-
ly contributes to excessive partisanship, 
your committee did not have sufficient 
evidence to conclude that any alternative 
election system is clearly preferable. 
Nonetheless, several aspects of elections 
contribute to excessive partisanship and 
ought to be considered.
The current system of holding “closed” 
partisan primary elections before the 
general election gives voters who regis-
ter with the two major parties greater 
influence than voters who choose to 
remain independent. As independent 
voters are not allowed to participate 
in the major partisan primaries, those 
voters receive the implicit message that 
they must be on one of the two major 
“teams” to be real “players.” Candidates 
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vatives and liberals are more likely to 
win election than centrist or moderate 
members of each party, not to mention 
independents.  Voters who have a less 
ideological orientation — even when 
they comprise a significant portion of a 
district’s population — feel under-repre-
sented and often view the Legislature as 
overly polarized and partisan.
Finally, the high cost and lengthy dura-
tion of campaigns make candidates 
dependent on 
interest groups and 
party leaders, which 
reinforces excessive 
partisanship. Each 
of these factors, 
along with a number 
of potential reforms, 




Your committee is of the opinion 
that the Legislature benefits from the 
presence of members of both parties 
who are willing to consider supporting 
legislation proposed by members of the 
opposing party and who can serve to 
broker compromises on contentious is-
sues. Your committee is convinced that 
the presence of such members often 
makes the difference between a truly 
deliberative body and one in which the 
majority party forces through as much 
as it can while the minority party blocks 
as much as it can. For that reason, 
your committee evaluated whether our 
electoral process makes it difficult for 
candidates to succeed if they do not 
engage in excessively partisan behavior. 
Your committee concluded that it does. 
This is not meant to assert any prefer-
ence for centrists as opposed to staunch 
conservative or liberal office-holders, 
but rather for an electoral system that 
does not systematically disadvantage 
any one part of the political spectrum.
Election observers 
often note that 
candidates posi-
tion themselves as 
staunch conserva-
tives or liberals to 
win the primary 
and then swing 
back to the center 
to win the general 
election. While the 
apparent duplicity 
of such posturing may be troublesome 
in itself, it reveals a more fundamental 
problem. Candidates often must make 
commitments to gain the support of 
party faithful in the primary. Once 
elected, such commitments tie their 
hands when the Legislature confronts 
difficult and controversial policy issues 
that cannot be resolved without some 
compromise. In addition, legislators 
who strive to serve their entire districts 
and support legislative compromises 
can be forced out of office by a majority 
of the voters in their party’s primary, 
even if a majority of their constituents 
would re-elect them.
“Your committee…does…
[n]ot assert any preference 
for centrists as opposed 
to staunch conservative 
or liberal office-holders, 
but rather for an electoral 
system that does not 
systematically disadvantage 
any one part of the political 
spectrum.”
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Most of the remainder of this chapter 
will be devoted to examining reforms 
of the redistricting process, campaign 
finance, and the election system to 
decide whether they would likely help 
to redress the tendency of the current 
systems to exclude those in the middle 
and to help mitigate excessive partisan-
ship. Before analyzing those reforms, 
however, your committee briefly com-
ments on the initiative and referendum 
system, which a number of witnesses 
tied to excessive partisanship.
The initiative and  
referendum
A number of witnesses, including for-
mer Senator Ben Westlund and former 
Representative Max Williams, pointed 
to the frequent use of the initiative, ref-
erendum and legislative referral systems 
as supporting excessive partisanship 
in that the process provides legislators 
with little incentive to compromise 
on tough issues. Williams suggested 
that initiatives, referenda and refer-
rals transfer legislative responsibilities 
directly to voters and allow legislators 
themselves to avoid engaging in mean-
ingful deliberation. He asked, “How do 
you position yourself around an issue 
that you can’t control?” Similarly, Eileen 
Qutub, a Republican who served as both 
a representative and a senator, noted 
that the availability of the referendum 
often means that legislators themselves 
do not have to vote on complex or con-
troversial issues.
Oregonians established the initiative 
and referendum systems early in the 
twentieth century, when public distrust 
of politicians was at an all-time high, in 
an effort to return a degree of political 
authority to the citizenry. Unfortu-
nately, the initiative and referendum 
have not proven to be a good means of 
developing creative solutions to complex 
and difficult problems. With the initia-
tive process, voters are presented with 
a simple yes or no choice on issues pro-
posed by an individual or group interest-
ed enough to fund a successful petition 
signature-gathering effort. Conversely, 
when a legislator knows that hard work 
and compromise on controversial is-
sues might not please politically active 
voters and can be overturned through 
the initiative or referendum process, 
and when that legislator knows that the 
voters may use the ballot to punish the 
legislator for addressing those issues, 
few legislators are willing to take risks.
The initiative and referendum processes 
have contributed to excessive partisan-
ship by casting issues in black and white 
and inhibiting nuanced understanding 
and compromise on important issues. 
The PCOL recommended that the initia-
tive be reformed to “[e]stablish a regular 
process for considering and possibly 
taking legislative action on initiative 
proposals.” The PCOL also recom-
mended several reforms to address the 
problem of the sponsorship and financ-
ing of initiatives by out-of-state interest 
groups. (See Appendix D.) More re-
cently, City Club of Portland specifically 
recommended the implementation of 
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an indirect initiative system* to improve 
legislative governance in Oregon.23 Your 
committee believes that such a system 
would mitigate excessive partisanship 
by creating opportunities for delibera-
tion and compromise in the Legislature 
before an issue is put to the voters.
redistricting
The Present System
The Oregon Constitution requires the 
Legislature to re-draw districts for Sena-
tors and Representatives according to 
population in the first session after each 
U.S. census. The Constitution also speci-
fies that the Supreme Court has original 
jurisdiction to review any reapportion-
ment enacted by the Legislature. If the 
Legislature fails to complete the task by 
the close of the legislative session, or if 
the Supreme Court rejects the proposed 
reapportionment plan, the responsibil-
ity defaults to the secretary of state 
who has forty-five days to propose new 
districts.24
*  The specific recommendation for imple-
menting an indirect initiative system is as 
follows: “In order to enhance public debate, 
consideration and study prior to a vote of the 
people, require legislative deliberation with at-
tendant public hearings for all citizen initiatives 
after they have qualified for the ballot. If the 
Legislature accepts a statutory initiative as pro-
posed, the Legislature enacts it into law. If the 
Legislature accepts a constitutional initiative 
as proposed, the constitutional change must 
still be referred to the voters for adoption. Any 
initiative the Legislature rejects (regardless of 
subject) would be submitted to the voters in the 
next election. In that case, the Legislature could 
take no further action, could enact its own 
law on the subject, or could refer a competing 
alternative to the voters.”
ORS 188.010 also establishes nonparti-
san criteria for redistricting:
Each district, as nearly as practi-1. 
cable, shall:
Be contiguous;a. 
Be of equal population;b. 
Utilize existing geographic or c. 
political boundaries;
Not divide communities of d. 
common interest; and
Be connected by transporta-e. 
tion links.
No district shall be drawn for the 2. 
purpose of favoring any political 
party, incumbent legislator or 
other person.
No district shall be drawn for 3. 
the purpose of diluting the vot-
ing strength of any language or 
ethnic minority group.
Two state House of Represen-4. 
tative districts shall be wholly 
included within a single state 
senatorial district.25 
Although ORS 188.010 specifically 
prohibits redistricting to favor any party 
or person, your committee concluded 
that it was probably impossible to avoid 
at least the perception that redistrict-
ing is used for partisan purposes as 
redistricting in Oregon is in the hands 
of party-affiliated elected officials. The 
party controlling redistricting can gain 
political advantage by drawing the dis-
trict lines so as to favor that party’s can-
didates. That party may do so in three 
principal ways: (1) packing voters of 
the minority party into as few districts 
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as possible, leaving a larger number of 
other districts favorable to the major-
ity party; (2) redrawing districts so that 
two minority party incumbents are in 
the same district where no more than 
one can be elected at the next election; 
and (3) redrawing the borders so that 
the incumbent from the majority party 
has a “safe” margin of victory in future 
elections. Such tactics allow the major-
ity to obtain an electoral advantage out 
of proportion to the majority’s level of 
support among voters statewide.
The Oregon Legislature has repeat-
edly failed to redistrict. In fact, “[t]he 
battle over redistricting is so conten-
tious,” writes Professor Clucas, “that the 
Legislature has not actually completed 
redistricting since 1911.”26 For example, 
in 1971 and 1991, the Legislature failed 
to complete its redistricting plan on 
time because in each of these years the 
two legislative houses were controlled 
by different parties. In 1961 and 1981, 
legal challenges tied up the plan.27
In 2001, the Republican-controlled 
Legislature in Oregon passed a re-
districting plan that was promptly 
vetoed by Democratic Governor John 
Kitzhaber. As the Republican majority 
in the Legislature failed to overturn 
the governor’s veto, the redistricting 
task fell to then-Secretary of State Bill 
Bradbury, a Democrat. Ted Ferrioli, 
Senate Republican Leader, claimed that 
Secretary of State Bradbury’s redistrict-
ing plan exhibited a greater degree of 
partisanship than the prior plan by for-
mer Democratic Secretary of State Phil 
Keisling, because borders were allegedly 
moved very small distances for no clear 
reason other than the 
Republicans’ resultant loss 
of control of the Senate. An 
editorial in The Oregonian 
echoed Ferrioli’s claim: 
“Republicans have been fu-
rious at [Secretary of State 
Bill] Bradbury ever since he 
sketched an overtly parti-
san redistricting map that 
helped Democrats reclaim 
the state Senate.”28 
Bradbury proposed a reapportionment 
that fourteen separate groups challenged. 
In Hartung v. Bradbury, the Oregon 
Supreme Court rejected all the chal-
lenges but one relatively minor one.29 In 
particular, the Supreme Court rejected a 
challenge that the secretary of state vio-
lated the Oregon statute discussed above 
that prohibits drawing districts to benefit 
any particular political party.
Examples of redistricting abuse from 
other states abound. The highly con-
tentious 2003 Republican-controlled 
redistricting process in Texas enabled 
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such a conclusion makes sense. Take for 
example a region with equal numbers of 
Democrats and Republicans that must 
be divided into two electoral districts. If 
the lines are drawn so that both districts 
have equal numbers of Democrats and 
Republicans, then it seems likely that 
their elections will result in contests 
between a moderate Democrat and a 
moderate Republican, and the winner 
will be someone who can appeal to inde-
pendents and moderate members of the 
other party. On the other hand, if the 
region is split so that one district has all 
the Democrats and 
one district has all 
the Republicans, 
then the real con-
test in each district 
will take place 
during the primary. 
The winner in one 
district will be the 
Democrat who has 
the most support 
among Democrats, 
while the winner in the other district 
will be the Republican who has the most 
support among Republicans. 
Although some scholars contend that no 
causal relationship exists between less 
competitive districts and polarization, 
most authorities agree that competitive 
districts make it easier for moderate 
candidates to win elections. In their 
article on electoral competitiveness, 
Professors Mark Kayser of the Univer-
sity of Rochester and Drew Linzer of 
Emory University cite research finding 
Republicans to gain 6 additional seats 
in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
In 2002, Maryland’s Democrats redrew 
the district lines and picked up two U.S. 
House seats. In 2001, Virginia’s Repub-
licans took control of the redistricting 
process and increased their control of 
the state house from just over one-half 
to two-thirds, even though a Democrat 
won the statewide race for Governor.30
Your committee concluded that it will 
always be impossible to determine the 
motivations of legislators in passing 
or not passing a plan for redistricting, 
of the governor in 
vetoing or not veto-
ing a plan passed 
by the Legislature, 
or of the secretary 
of state if the work 
should fall to that 
office. But as long 
as the redistricting 
process is con-
trolled by partisan 
elected officials, the 
perception — if not the reality — that 
the process is characterized by excessive 
partisanship will be a perennial prob-
lem. The perception alone can give rise 
to unnecessary animosity between the 
parties and prompt even more exces-
sively partisan behavior. 
In addition to examining whether exces-
sive partisanship characterizes the re-
districting process, your committee also 
considered whether non-competitive 
districts resulting from partisan redis-
tricting reduce the likelihood of the elec-
tion of moderates. As a matter of logic, 
“[a]s long as the 
redistricting process is 
controlled by partisan 
elected officials, the 
perception — if not the 
reality — that the process is 
characterized by excessive 
partisanship will be a 
perennial problem.”
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that politicians elected from com-
petitive districts are more responsive to 
their median constituents.31 Similarly, 
legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin writes that 
scholarly research supports the con-
clusion that partisan gerrymandering 
leads to the election of more ideological 
candidates who appeal to their party’s 
base. Toobin observes that redistrict-
ing has transformed American politics, 
making the U.S. House of Representa-
tives in particular more entrenched: 
“Members of the House now effectively 
answer only to primary voters, who 
represent the extreme partisan edge of 
both parties. As a result, collaboration 
and compromise between the parties 
have almost disappeared.”32
A 2005 conference hosted by The 
Council for Excellence in Government 
and The Campaign Legal Center reached 
similar conclusions about polarization 
which results from excessively partisan 
redistricting. The argument might be 
applied to the impact of excessively 
partisan redistricting in Oregon:
“A clear connection exists be-
tween the geopolitics of redis-
tricting for partisan safety and 
the growing partisanship in the 
House of Representatives and 
in many state legislatures. In 
safe districts, the party primary 
is the key election and even that 
often is not very competitive. In 
safe districts, the small primary 
turnout of a party’s most ardent 
partisans determines who goes 
to Washington (or the state-
house), and these core partisan 
voters usually select candidates 
similarly close to their parties’ 
ideological extremes. This leaves 
fewer members of Congress in 
the political center, or with any 
incentive to work toward bipar-
tisan solutions. Conversely, in 
competitive districts, it’s the 
general election that matters, 
when candidates must appeal to 
independents and cross-overs 
to win. Candidates who can 
build such bridges with the elec-
torate are more likely to do the 
same with colleagues from the 
‘other side’ once in office.”33
Your committee concludes that there 
exists — at minimum — a widespread 
perception that excessive partisanship 
characterizes the redistricting process. 
Your committee also concludes that 
excessively partisan redistricting, when 
it does occur, generally results in the 
creation of “safe districts” where candi-
dates who are less partisan face greater 
obstacles to winning elections.
Proposed Redistricting Reforms
Although the House and the PCOL 
have both made proposals to minimize 
partisan abuse of redistricting, neither 
proposal has been implemented. In the 
2005 session of the Oregon Legislature, 
Representative Debi Farr, Democrat 
from Eugene, introduced a Joint Resolu-
tion (HJR 39) to establish an indepen-
dent redistricting commission. Had 
it been enacted, the resolution would 
have created a five-member redistrict-
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ing commission of state and federal 
judges. The bill passed the House but 
died in the Senate Rules Committee. In 
2006 the PCOL recommended creat-
ing a nonpartisan State Controller to 
manage, administer, and oversee state 
elections, election policy, campaign 
finance administration, and investiga-
tions including elections and ethics 
issues. Management, administration, 
and oversight responsibilities would 
also include legislative redistricting. 
The State Controller would appoint a 
five-member redistricting commission, 
consisting of individuals who have not 
held public office or political party office 
within two years of their appointment. 
The State Controller would have at least 
a six-year term and be prohibited from 
seeking statewide elective office for two 
years afterward. (See Appendix D.)
Given the pervasive abuse of partisan 
redistricting across the nation, twenty 
states have established commissions 
to help in the redistricting process. In 
twelve of these states, the commissions 
have primary authority for redistricting. 
Three state commissions are advisory 
and develop plans that are submitted to 
the Legislature for approval. Five state 
commissions prepare redistricting plans 
if the legislatures are unable to agree on 
plans within the allotted time. The com-
missions in these various states have be-
tween three and fifteen members. In all 
these states active politicians and party 
leaders play a part in selecting commis-
sion members. Otherwise, existing state 
redistricting commissions vary widely in 
make-up and responsibilities.
Your committee recommends the estab-
lishment of a nonpartisan redistricting 
commission in Oregon because such a 
commission would not only be more 
effective than the current system, which 
has not worked since 1911, but would 
also reduce the abuses of excessive par-
tisanship. While not a perfect solution, 
a nonpartisan redistricting commission, 
made up of members with a cross-
section of political beliefs, would be the 
best way to prevent excessively partisan 
redistricting and address the perception 
that redistricting decisions are moti-
vated by partisan concerns.
If Oregon establishes a redistricting 
commission, many details will need 
to be addressed, such as the number 
of members and their qualifications, 
the appointment process, and proce-
dural rules and timelines. An important 
subject that must also be addressed is 
what roles the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches will play if there is a 
commission with primary responsibil-
ity for redistricting. The twelve states 
with nonpartisan redistricting commis-
sions have set up their commissions in 
different ways, and there is extensive 
literature comparing and analyzing 
them. Because of the complexity of 
the subject, your committee recom-
mends that City Club establish another 
research committee to prepare a more 
detailed recommendation on the form 
and function of a nonpartisan redistrict-
ing commission.
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Campaigns and  
Campaign finance
How Rising Campaign Costs Have 
Fueled Excessive Partisanship
Many witnesses identified the increas-
ing cost of elections, with the resultant 
need to raise more funds from interest 
groups, as a reason for excessive par-
tisanship. House campaigns now cost 
between $300,000 to $400,000 and Sen-
ate campaigns cost between $750,000 
to $1,000,000.34 On a per capita basis, 
this cost ranges between $5.50 to $8.00 
per district resident. Hotly contested 
campaigns can be much higher. The high 
cost of campaigns has meant that leg-
islators are constantly concerned with 
raising money. Besides distracting them 
from the deliberative process, such reli-
ance on campaign funds also threatens 
to make legislators less likely to assert 
their independence when it comes to 
making legislative policy choices.
The cost of campaigns has risen 
dramatically for a variety of reasons. 
Vote-by-mail, an Oregon innovation, 
has increased costs because candidates 
need to keep their message in front of 
voters for an extended period of time 
as opposed to concentrating it in the 
days immediately before election day. 
Another reason for the increased cost 
of campaigns is that campaigns have 
become more professional, with paid 
consultants shaping the message and 
content.
Reliance on money from partisan inter-
est groups can polarize the campaign 
debate. As noted earlier in this report, 
much of the money for campaigns 
comes from the lobby and interest 
groups, which support candidates in 
order to obtain access to the candidate 
once elected. Once a candidate becomes 
dependent on these funds, he or she 
then has a difficult time taking a posi-
tion or making a statement at odds 
with that group’s particular agenda. 
Candidates receiving large sums of such 
money are often expected to make very 
specific and uncompromising state-
ments in support of the interest group’s 
positions. While such absolute and cer-
tain statements can be helpful to voters 
trying to identify a particular candi-
date’s stance on issues, they can also 
lead to excessive partisanship. When a 
candidate takes an uncompromising po-
sition during a campaign, opponents of 
that position have very little hope to be 
able to work with that candidate should 
he or she get elected. Such rigidity raises 
the stakes of the election for these 
individuals and fosters a win-at-all-
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costs mentality. A much more divisive, 
personal and bitterly fought campaign 
usually results, making reconciliation 
with one’s opponents extremely difficult 
after the election.
In addition to the growing costs of cam-
paigning and the increasing dependence 
of candidates on their financial contrib-
utors, witnesses also reported increased 
caucus control over campaign funding. 
If a legislator crosses the party line, 
or insufficiently supports the party’s 
agenda, that legislator may not receive 
adequate financial support from his or 
her caucus in the next election. Former 
representative Tony Van Vliet of Corval-
lis observed that the challenge is getting 
people “who will really level and work 
toward solutions” and that the main 
barrier to making this happen is caucus 
control over campaign funding. 
Your committee concluded that the 
financial imperatives of legislative 
electoral campaigns lead to reliance on 
money from partisan interest groups 
and the caucus leadership, which in turn 
leads to excessive partisanship, and that 
a number of potential campaign finance 
reforms should be considered.
Analyzing Campaign  
Finance-Reform Options
Your committee focused on three op-
tions for addressing the negative impact 
of campaign costs on partisanship: (1) 
public ownership and financing of elec-
tions, (2) campaign contribution and 
spending limits and (3) greater cam-
paign-finance transparency. The PCOL 
did not make specific recommendations 
on any of these topics. Rather, it recom-
mended that a commission be formed 
to examine the role of campaign finance 
in legislative decision-making, that the 
Legislature reform the use of campaign 
funds by candidates and elected offi-
cials, and that consideration be given to 
moving the primary election date later 
to shorten the campaign season. (See 
Appendix D.) 
Public Ownership and Financing of 
Elections
While the proposal for public financing 
of elections met with general support 
from journalists, lobbyists and other 
witnesses, these witnesses invariably 
pointed out that the proposal lacks 
public support and that a very vocal 
minority opposes it. In 1976 two of 
your committee’s witnesses, Attor-
ney General and former Speaker of 
the House Hardy Myers and former 
Oregon Supreme Court Judge Hans 
Linde, were instrumental in qualifying 
a ballot measure — Measure 7 — for a 
constitutional amendment to provide 
partial public financing of elections, but 
voters defeated this measure 659,327 to 
263,738.
Your committee concluded that public 
financing of elections might potentially 
minimize excessive partisanship, but 
your committee did not obtain enough 
evidence or conduct sufficient research 
to conclude that adopting such a system 
would successfully reduce the influence 
City Club of Portland
48
Bridging the ParTisan divide
49
of those who have substantial money 
to spend on elections. Furthermore, 
your committee doubted that sufficient 
political will and public support existed 
to institute such a system state-wide. 
However, if the City of Portland’s 
“voter-owned elections” system proves 
to work well, that success might make 
it worthwhile to consider adopting a 
similar system for state elections.
Limits on Campaign Contributions 
and Spending
Various provisions for campaign con-
tribution or spending limits in Oregon 
have been proposed over time. In 1997, 
the Oregon Supreme Court struck down 
limits on campaign contributions and 
expenditures as violating the right to 
engage in political speech protected in 
the Oregon Constitution.35 The follow-
ing year proponents of campaign finance 
reform passed Measure 62, which sought 
to amend the Constitution, but the 
Oregon Supreme Court invalidated that 
measure because it unconstitutionally 
violated the separate vote requirement 
of the Constitution.36 More recently, in 
2006, proponents of campaign finance 
reform succeeded in placing Measures 46 
and 47 on the ballot. Ballot Measure 46, 
which did not pass, proposed amend-
ing the Constitution to allow campaign 
contribution and expenditure limita-
tions. Ballot Measure 47, which did pass, 
proposed the specific limitations. Since 
Ballot Measure 47 was dependent upon 
the passage of Measure 46, these limita-
tions have not become law.
Some witnesses, including opinion re-
searchers Tim Hibbitts and Bob Moore, 
maintained that campaign finance 
legislation would actually contribute to 
polarization. When direct contributions 
to campaigns are limited, more money 
flows to political action committees that 
are not responsible to any candidate 
and that frequently engage in malicious 
campaign advertising. The journalists 
Jeff Mapes of The Oregonian, Charles 
Beggs of the Associated Press, and 
Peter Wong of The Statesman Journal 
also pointed out that campaign finance 
limitations have not reduced excessive 
partisanship in Congress.
Your committee agreed that plac-
ing limits on campaign contributions 
would not alleviate excessive partisan-
ship as money would likely be used in 
other ways by groups less accountable 
than candidates. Your committee was 
also concerned about the questionable 
constitutionality of restricting people’s 
rights to support candidates or issues.
Greater Campaign Finance  
Transparency
In 2005 the Legislature passed HB 
3458, directing the secretary of state 
to develop an electronic filing system 
where campaign committees would be 
required to file contribution and expen-
diture information. The system, called 
ORESTAR, became fully functional on 
January 1, 2007. The law creating ORE-
STAR required that:
Candidates and political                  •	
act ion committees  f i le       
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campaign finance information 
electronically with the secretary of 
state’s office.
Candidates and committees con-•	
tinuously report campaign finance 
information, with most reports due 
within thirty days of the transac-
tion; in the six weeks prior to 
the election the filing deadline is    
reduced to within seven days of the 
transaction; and certain candidates 
and committees must report contri-
butions during a legislative session 
within two days.
Contributor and payee aggregates •	
must be reported once specified 
thresholds have been reached.
In the words of Troy Nichols, chief of 
staff to former House Speaker Karen 
Minnis during the 2005 legislative ses-
sion, the system would offer “real-time, 
prompt, frequent reporting that people 
can see and understand.” It would make 
candidates “think twice,” he added, 
“about taking that large contribution.”
The new web-based contribution report-
ing system certainly has provided in-
creased transparency, but it is too early 
to tell if this greater transparency has 
diminished excessive partisanship.
election reforms
Your committee also examined a 
number of other potential election 
system reforms, including nonpartisan 
elections, the top-two primary, instant 
run-off voting, multi-member districts, 
and fusion voting, all of which will be 
explained in more detail below. Your 
committee attempted to determine 
whether these potential reforms might 
reduce or increase partisanship by ex-
amining each reform against features of 
good electoral and legislative processes 
hurt by excessive partisanship. 
As stated previously, these positive 
features include: ease of recruitment of 
well-qualified candidates for legislative 
office; high electoral participation, and 
the election of legislators who serve 
all voters, not just those affiliated with 
major parties or strong special interests; 
good relationships and civility among 
legislators; deliberation and resolution 
of policy issues with input from the ma-
jority and minority; and public respect 
for and confidence in the Legislature.
All of the reforms your committee 
considered have advantages over our 
current system and have the potential 
to mitigate excessive partisanship. This 
report provides your committee’s analy-
sis below but does not make a recom-
mendation for any single one of them. 
Minimizing partisanship is not the sole 
criterion for a good election system, 
and a more comprehensive analysis 
should inform any decision to overhaul 
Oregon’s elections system.
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Ballot does not identify 
party affiliation of candi-
dates.
Nebraska possesses the only nonpartisan 
state legislature. Many county and city 
elections in Oregon and across the U.S. 
are nonpartisan. PCOL recommended 
consideration of this reform.
Top-Two 
Primary
All candidates participate 
in one primary, and the top 
two candidates advance to 
the general election.
Used in several states, including Wash-
ington. Recommended by PCOL in 2006. 
Ballot measure defeated in 2008. 
Instant  
Run-Off /  
Ranked- 
Choice Voting
Voters rank all candidates 
on the ballot. Votes for the 
last-place candidate are 
reallocated to voters’ next 
preferences. This process 
repeats until one candidate 
has a majority of the votes.
Used by a few local jurisdictions in the 
U.S., but none in Oregon. Advocates have 
introduced instant-run-off bills several 







Legislative districts are 
made larger so that two or 
more candidates are elected 
from each district.
U.S. Senate districts have two members. 
The Oregon Legislature had multi-mem-
ber districts prior to the 1970s.
Fusion Voting A minor party can endorse 
the same candidate as a 
major party, and voters 
can select which party they 
prefer when they cast their 
votes for that candidate.
Legal in seven states, but only actively 
used in New York and Connecticut. The 
Working Families Party, which is active in 
New York, is advocating for fusion voting 
in Oregon.
Nonpartisan Elections /  
Nonpartisan Legislature
In a nonpartisan election, the ballot lists 
candidates without identifying their 
party affiliation. If a “primary” election 
exists at all, it is open to all candidates 
and voters, and simply serves to narrow 
the field to two candidates for the gen-
eral election. Only one state, Nebraska, 
holds nonpartisan elections for its 
Legislature and organizes its Legislature 
along nonpartisan lines. Nebraska’s Leg-
islature has no majority or minority cau-
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cuses. During the 2005 Oregon Legisla-
tive session, Democratic Senator Charlie 
Ringo sponsored legislation that would 
have made the Oregon Legislature 
nonpartisan, but the bill did not make 
it out of the Senate’s Rules Committee. 
In 2006, the PCOL recommended that 
each house of the Legislature should be 
free to determine whether its members 
will be elected with partisan labels. (See 
Appendix D.) 
Your committee is of the opinion that 
a nonpartisan legislature might result 
in better deliberation and resolution 
of policy issues because agendas and 
debates would not be controlled by 
party leadership — a type of control 
that your committee concluded had led 
to excessive partisanship in the past. 
In addition, your committee believes 
that a nonpartisan legislature would 
result in improved civility and better 
relationships between legislators of dif-
ferent political ideologies. But although 
independent voters and voters in the 
political minority would have a greater 
chance to participate, voters in general 
would have to make more of an effort to 
learn about policy issues and legislators’ 
positions, as voters would not have the 
parties to define the issues for them. 
Your committee was concerned, there-
fore, that less motivated voters might 
pay insufficient attention to issues 
without some partisan guidance, giving 
activist voters and partisan interest 
groups greater influence, a factor that 
your committee concluded had led to 
excessive partisanship under the pres-
ent system.
Top-Two Primary
In a top-two primary, all registered 
voters, regardless of party affiliation or 
non-affiliation, would receive the same 
primary ballot and would be free to vote 
for any candidate seeking to advance to 
the general election. The two candidates 
receiving the most votes would then 
advance to the general election. Those 
two candidates might be from the same 
political party, from different parties, or 
report no party affiliation at all. 
In 2006, the PCOL recommended the 
creation of what it referred to as an 
“open” primary, but which in the politi-
cal science literature is more commonly 
understood as a top-two primary. (See 
Appendix D.)  Washington state held its 
first top-two primary in 2008.  
In 2008, supporters of the top-two pri-
mary in Oregon succeeded in gathering 
enough signatures to place a top-two 
primary proposal on the ballot. A sepa-
rate City Club committee recommended 
against supporting that ballot initiative.  
That committee expressed concerns that 
a top-two primary might decrease voter 
participation in the general election, as 
limiting the general election to two can-
didates might exclude some of Oregon’s 
qualified political parties from the gen-
eral election, making some voters affili-
ated with those unrepresented parties 
less likely to participate. The committee 
also expressed concern that moderate 
voters might run the risk of diluting 
their influence by spreading their votes 
among numerous moderate candidates, 
t h e r e b y  a l l o w i n g  a  m i n o i t y 
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of diehard supporters of extreme can-
didates to advance their candidates  to 
the general election. That committee 
also observed that national and societal 
influences contribute to excessive 
partisanship in Oregon and questioned 
whether electoral changes at the state 
level could ameliorate the problem.37 
The top-two primary initiative ultimate-
ly was defeated at the polls. 
Although the 2008 City Club ballot mea-
sure report expressed concerns about 
the potentially negative unintended 
consequences of the top-two primary, 
the Washington top-two primary 
system, which has only been in place 
since 2008, provides a valuable oppor-
tunity for Oregonians to observe how 
such a system would operate in practice 
over time. Your committee encourages 
observers to pay close attention in 
particular to the following: (1) whether 
voter participation increases or decreas-
es in the primary election and in the 
general election, particularly in districts 
that are predominantly Democratic or 
Republican, (2) whether vote dilution 
affects moderate candidates more than 
extreme candidates in the primary, (3) 
whether the general election winners in 
predominantly Democratic or Republi-
can districts tend to be more moderate 
than in the past due to the influence of 
minority-party voters in the primary 
and (4) whether elected legislators 
who compromise with opposing party 
members on major policy issues are able 
to win reelection with the support of 
cross-over voters.
Instant Run-Off / Ranked-Choice 
Voting
In an instant run-off election, voters 
rank all the candidates on the ballot. 
Voters’ first choices are tallied first. 
Then the candidate with the least votes 
is eliminated. The votes for that candi-
date are reallocated to other candidates 
based on voters’ second choices. That 
process continues until two candidates 
remain. The candidate with more than 
50 percent of the vote wins. 
As an illustration, in an election with 
three candidates and one hundred vot-




Candidate C is the first to be eliminated, 
and the 25 votes for that candidate are 
redistributed. If 20 of the voters who 
preferred Candidate C listed Candidate 
B as their second choice and the other 
5 listed Candidate A as their second 
choice, Candidate B would be elected 
and the final tally would look like this:
•	 Candidate	B	(moderate)		 55	votes
•	 Candidate	A	(conservative)		 45	votes
In an instant run-off system, there 
may be only a general election, with 
no primary election. Another possible 
variation involves using the instant 
run-off method in the party primaries, 
as well as in the general election. A few 
local jurisdictions in the United States 
have adopted instant run-off voting, 
including San Francisco and Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.
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Your committee believes that an instant 
run-off system would promote better 
dialogue during campaigns, as minor 
parties would more likely be involved 
and candidates would also likely need 
to reach out to a broader spectrum of 
voters in order to win “second choice” 
votes. Your committee also thought that 
the need to appeal to a broad spectrum 
of voters would make the Legislature 
more representative of the state as a 
whole. Your committee also thought 
that instant run-off elections had good 
potential to increase voter participa-
tion because all voters would be able 
to express their strongest preferences 
while also having a say about other  
candidates, potentially drawing in more 
supporters of minority candidates.
Multi-Member Districts / 
Proportional Representation
Proportional representation uses 
larger districts from which two or 
more members are elected, rather 
than one member of the Legislature 
being elected from each district. The 
U.S. Senate is organized along these 
lines, with two senators represent-
ing each state. In the past, Oregon 
legislators represented multi-member 
districts. The Legislature abolished                     
multi-member districts in a special 
session in 1971.38 Nineteen states cur-
rently have multi-member districts for 
their Legislatures, including Alaska, 
Nevada and Washington. Europe also 
has a form of proportional represen-
tation, where voters vote for parties 
rather than candidates, and the parties 
fill seats from their candidates, typi-
cally according to a ranked candidate 
list.
Your committee saw some potential for 
proportional representation to improve 
voter participation and for the Legis-
lature to become more representative 
of the population. Otherwise, your 
committee was divided on the potential 
impact of multi-member districts on 
excessive partisanship.
Fusion Voting
In fusion voting, a candidate can seek 
the nomination of both a major and a 
minor party. Voters supporting that 
candidate have the choice of casting 
their votes either on the major party 
ticket or on the minor party ticket. 
Therefore, voters can express their sup-
port of a minor party’s platform without 
“throwing away” their votes on a candi-
date who has no real chance of winning. 
In this way, fusion voting shares one of 
the main advantages of instant run-off 
voting. Fusion voting has been adopted 
in a few places in the United States, 
including New York State.
Your committee thought fusion voting 
would allow more viewpoints to be ex-
pressed during campaigns, but some of 
those views could be fringe or extreme, 
causing more division than dialogue. 
Your committee also thought that 
fusion voting could motivate more sup-
porters of minor parties to participate 
in elections.
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In summary, your committee concluded 
that all of the above alternative voting 
systems had the potential to minimize 
partisanship, but your committee also 
concluded that it did not currently have 
the tools to recommend for or against 
any of the specific alternatives. Your 
committee, however, believes that all of 
these alternatives are worthy of further 
study.
Chapter Conclusions
Oregon’s current election sys- ➤
tem contributes to excessive 
partisanship by disadvantaging 
independent candidates, centrist 
candidates, and candidates who are 
willing to compromise with mem-
bers of the opposing party on major 
policy issues.
Excessively partisan considerations  ➤
frequently influence the redistrict-
ing process, giving the party in 
power at the time of redistricting a 
tool to increase its power in a way 
that does not accurately represent 
the political make-up of the voters. 
The need to raise campaign funds  ➤
leads to excessive partisanship 
because legislators are dependent 
on party leadership and interest 
groups aligned with the parties.
Chapter  
recommendations
The Legislature should refer to  ➤
voters a constitutional amendment 
establishing a nonpartisan redis-
tricting commission.
City Club of Portland should  ➤
establish a research committee to 
prepare a detailed recommenda-
tion for a nonpartisan redistricting 
commission.
City Club should establish a re- ➤
search committee to study alterna-
tive election systems.
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This report has focused primarily on 
features of our electoral system and Leg-
islature that contribute to partisanship. 
For the most part, these features can be 
modified through changes in law, proce-
dure or administration. Many witnesses 
also commented on how the public and 
the media contribute to partisanship 




can result in part 
from the public’s 
lack of knowledge 
regarding legisla-
tive processes and 
that this lack of 
knowledge in turn 
stems from the rela-
tively limited and 
poor quality of media coverage of the 
Legislature. While public attitudes and 
media coverage are generally beyond the 
reach of policy reforms, your committee 
provides here an analysis of how the me-
dia and public attitudes drive excessive 
partisanship.
Studies by the National Conference 
of State Legislatures suggest that the 
public neither understands how govern-
ment works nor feels connected to those 
who get elected.39 Therefore, excessively 
partisan pressure on the Legislature 
may, to some extent, result from the 
fact that the public does not fully ap-
preciate the difficul-
ties of governance. 
When the public 
does not appre-
ciate the costs, 
consequences or 
tradeoffs that come 
from adopting poli-
cies, the public can 
put enormous pres-
sure on legislators 
to adopt uncompro-
mising and exces-
sively partisan agendas that may not 
be entirely good for the state. Were the 
public to gain a deeper understanding 
of the workings of the Legislature and 
the issues the Legislature considers, the 
public might not insist on such partisan 
agendas or be so quick to punish those 
HoW THe PUBliC and THe Media 
fUel eXCessive ParTisansHiP
“[e]xcessive partisanship 
can result in part from the 
public’s lack of knowledge 
regarding legislative 
processes and … this lack 
of knowledge in turn 
stems from the relatively 
limited and poor quality 
of media coverage of the 
legislature.”
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who compromise. This better under-
standing would give legislators more 
room to develop creative and effective 
solutions to policy and budget problems. 
Former Senate Majority Leader Kate 
Brown, a Democrat from Portland, 
thought the Legislature might educate 
the public and help mitigate exces-
sive partisanship by holding more 
public hearings and meetings outside 
of Salem. Indeed, the Legislature has 
recently endeavored to do so. During 
the 2005 session, the Legislature held 
hearings in twenty-two counties where 
it heard testimony from more than a 
thousand Oregonians. The Legislature 
also changed the requirement for public 
notice before hearings from 24 to 48 
hours, giving the public more time to 
prepare and respond.
The PCOL also recommended that the 
Legislature improve public access to the 
legislative process by providing bet-
ter notice of meetings and bills under 
consideration, and that the Legislature 
contribute to funding a public broad-
casting television channel for the 2007 
session on a trial basis. (See Appendix 
D.) In response, the Oregon Legislature, 
Oregon Public Broadcasting, Southern 
Oregon Public Television, the Oregon 
University System and the Oregon 
Public Affairs Network joined together 
to form the Oregon Channel pilot proj-
ect, which broadcasted gavel-to-gavel 
coverage of the 2007 Oregon Legislative 
session and other state government and 
public affairs events. Your committee 
concluded that the Legislature should 
continue its efforts to increase public 
knowledge of the legislative process and 
that the Legislature should continue to 
hold hearings around the state in order 
to expand opportunities for public par-
ticipation in policy making.
Your committee also concluded that the 
amount and quality of media coverage 
of the Oregon political system must also 
be improved to help mitigate excessive 
partisanship. The number of reporters 
in Salem covering the Legislature and 
governmental issues has declined over 
the last several decades, leaving the pub-
lic without sufficiently balanced and in-
formative coverage of legislative policy 
issues and processes.40 Several witnesses 
expressed the view that this media 
phenomenon is a part of the coarsening 
of society. Analyst Tim Hibbits tied it 
to increasing attention on ratings: “You 
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don’t generate high ratings by saying, 
‘Let’s have a rational discussion.’”
The Center for Media and Public Af-
fairs (CMPA) conducted an analysis of 
political advertising and political news 
coverage in the Chicago, Milwaukee and 
Portland markets, based on the month 
before the 2004 November election. 
During that month, of all the televi-
sion news aired in the Portland market, 
only 4.9 percent of airtime was devoted 
to coverage of political campaigns and 
elections. Seventy-eight percent of this 
very limited coverage was devoted to 
the presidential race. Conversely, only 
1 percent focused on state legislative 
or local candidate races. In fact, races 
in Washington state and other states 
garnered more coverage in the Portland 
television market than Oregon state and 
local races.41
This limited political coverage also 
lacked substantive content. CMPA 
found that over 60 percent of the local 
television election coverage focused on 
campaign strategy or the “horse race” 
aspect of campaigns. Only 24 percent of 
these stories focused on the underlying 
issues at stake in the election.42 These 
numbers suggest that the media is much 
more inclined to cover the tactics and 
poll-results of campaigns than they are 
to inform the public about the policy 
implications of their votes. One legisla-
tive veteran refused to blame the media, 
however, because “the public is hooked 
on the thirty-second sound-bite and is 
not very tolerant of much detail.” Media 
outlets are simply not rewarded for in-
depth coverage. 
As traditional media have sought to re-
main profitable by decreasing state and 
local government news coverage, news-
letters, talk radio commentators and 
blogs have sought to fill some of that 
vacuum. These alternate news sources 
tend to have different missions than 
traditional media. Some are providers 
of entertainment, such as talk radio, 
which mixes news and reaction. Others, 
like blogs, provide venues for discussion 
and opinion. These sources of “infotain-
ment” and discussion do not have the 
degree of objectivity that the public 
expects from traditional media. In es-
sence, a “buyer-beware” marketplace of 
opinions and ideas has been created. The 
multiplicity of sources may also make 
it harder and more time consuming 
to judge the credibility of a particular 
source of information. Moreover, exces-
sive partisanship can be exacerbated by 
these information sources to the extent 
that people rely on others’ strong opin-
ions as news. 
Although several witnesses expressed 
hope that the Internet and expanded 
use of blogs will increase information 
available to the public and improve the 
quality of political coverage, Profes-
sors Russ Dondero of Pacific University 
and William Lunch of Oregon State 
University, and political analyst Jim 
Moore, suggest that such optimistic 
claims may underestimate the public’s 
desire to filter information sources to 
suit personal or ideological biases. Some 
newer forms of electronic media, such as 
blogs and list-serves, allow the public to 
seek information and then immediately 
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react to that information with their own 
thoughts and analysis.43 As a result, 
news forums are experiencing increased 
editorializing. Like the consumers of 
political talk radio, readers of blogs and 
newer forms of electronic media must 
be more politically aware to understand 
the difference between these forums 
and mainstream news media. 
Nevertheless, your committee recog-
nized that this tendency for non-tra-
ditional media to exacerbate excessive 
partisanship may be offset to some 
degree by astute use of blogs. These 
resources allow readers to explore, 
weigh and compare numerous available 
opinions and discussions on a particular 
subject. The problem, of course, is that 
this approach depends entirely on the 
willingness of readers to seek out bal-
anced perspectives and their ability to 
find credible material. 
Your committee concluded that the mul-
tiplicity of non-traditional media might 
allow for the dissemination of a greater 
variety of views, but that this oppor-
tunity must be balanced by individual 
responsibility to use these resources 
wisely. The Legislature itself also has 
the opportunity, which many members 
have been using, to provide significant 
information through its web pages.
As explained above, a citizenry that ap-
preciates the complexities of governance 
is less likely to insist on excessively par-
tisan agendas and to punish legislators 
who make pragmatic compromises. The 
media clearly plays a crucial role in this 
regard. When media coverage focuses on 
conflict and ignores nuanced delibera-
tion, the public loses confidence in the 
Legislature and legislative processes. 
Balanced and thorough coverage of is-
sues and policy positions, accompanied 
by accurate information about legisla-
tors themselves, is essential to the 
development of an informed citizenry 
that understands the complex delibera-
tive processes that are essential to good 
lawmaking. 
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Chapter Conclusions
Limited and poor media coverage of  ➤
Oregon’s political system contrib-
utes to excessive partisanship.
A public that is poorly informed  ➤
about legislative processes and 




The Legislature should continue to  ➤
build upon its efforts to conduct 
legislative business in communi-
ties throughout the state and to 
publish information and proceed-
ings online. 
City Club should support efforts to  ➤
increase substantive and objective 
policy news reporting in the media.
City Club of Portland
60
Bridging the ParTisan divide
61
ConClUsions 
Partisanship serves to help develop and clarify competing visions of what is 1. 
best for Oregon and it helps focus the activities of voters and legislators from 
different parties.
Excessive partisanship is widely perceived as having increased over the past 2. 
several decades in Oregon.
Excessive partisanship is a problem in Oregon that should be addressed be-3. 
cause it impairs legislators’ ability to deliberate and collaborate on legislation, 
results in legislative gridlock, discourages qualified candidates from running 
for office and leads to voter disaffection.
Limited and poor media coverage of the political system in Oregon has con-4. 
tributed to excessive partisanship.
A public that is poorly informed about legislative processes and policy issues 5. 
contributes to political polarization.
Oregon’s Republican and Democratic state parties are grassroots organizations 6. 
that serve the valuable function of involving citizens in the political process, 
but they have little direct involvement in the state Legislature. 
Legislative caucus leaders and presiding officers possess more power than 7. 
the state parties when it comes to pressuring legislators to support partisan 
agendas.
Strong interest groups aligned with either the Democrats or the Republicans 8. 
often reinforce excessive partisanship by pressuring legislators to commit to 
uncompromising agendas.
Oregon’s current election system contributes to excessive partisanship by 9. 
disadvantaging independent candidates, centrist candidates, and candidates 
who are willing to compromise with members of the opposing party on major 
policy issues.
Excessively partisan considerations frequently influence the redistricting 10. 
process, giving the party in power at the time of redistricting a tool to increase 
its power in a way that does not accurately represent the political make-up of 
the voters. 
Legislators become dependent on party leadership and interest groups aligned 11. 
with the parties because of the need to raise campaign funds.
Because of the structure of Oregon’s Legislature, which is characterized by a 12. 
strong-leader system, the leaders have tremendous discretion and set the tone 
for partisanship or collaboration.
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As most of Oregon’s legislative rules are subject to revision by simple-majority 13. 
vote, they can be — and have been — easily manipulated to satisfy the imme-
diate demands of the majority party in a particular house.
Oregon’s legislative rules currently give undue authority to its presiding of-14. 
ficers, who can easily use these rules to control both committee assignments 
and the movement of legislation in a way that demands loyalty from majority 
party members and that excludes members of the minority party from a mean-
ingful role in the legislative process. 
The strong leader system fosters excessive partisanship by rewarding a winner-15. 
takes-all approach to controlling the Senate and House of Representatives.
Ostensibly nonpartisan administrative staff officers are subject to the impera-16. 
tives of the party in control of a particular house.
While committees remain important in the Legislature, their power has some-17. 
what diminished because of the increasing power of the caucuses. 
Courteous and extensive working relationships among experienced legislators 18. 
contribute to good deliberation.
The Legislature has experienced an unraveling of relationships, which has 19. 
inhibited its ability to function well as a deliberative body.
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reCoMMendaTions
Administration of the Legislature
The Legislature should hold pre-session conference retreats to provide more 1. 
training and more opportunities for legislators to forge lasting and productive 
professional relationships across party lines.
The Legislature should continue to build upon its efforts to conduct legislative 2. 
business in communities throughout the state and to publish information and 
proceedings online. 
Legislative Rules and Procedures
The House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that establish propor-3. 
tional representation of party members on committees and permit the leaders 
of each caucus to determine which of its members to appoint to committees. 
When making committee assignments, caucus leaders should take into ac-
count the experience, interest and seniority of legislators.
The House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that require the vice- 4. 
chair of each committee to be a member of the minority party, and committee 
chairs should consult with vice-chairs in developing committee agendas.
While the House’s Teamwork Bill is a step in the right direction, the House 5. 
and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that allow each member of the 
Legislature to require a committee hearing on a predetermined number of bills 
during each legislative session.
The House should maintain and the Senate should adopt rules permitting 6. 
a majority of each of their members to require a committee or floor hear-
ing on a bill. In addition, the House and Senate should adopt and maintain 
rules permitting a substantial minority of each of their members to require a 
committee or floor hearing on a bill that has already been passed by the other 
chamber.
The House should maintain and the Senate should adopt rules ensuring that 7. 
the Secretary of the Senate and the Chief Clerk of the House are nonpartisan 
and serve members of both parties, not at the sole discretion of the presiding 
officers. In addition, the House and Senate should employ permanent staff 
with knowledge of substantive policy areas to support the work of committees. 
Once the above rules are adopted, the House and Senate should require a su-8. 
permajority to change these and other rules that protect each member’s right 
to participate in the legislative process.
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Constitutional Amendments
The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment establishing 9. 
a nonpartisan redistricting commission.
The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would 10. 
establish annual legislative sessions of limited length, commencing in March, 
shortly after the state Office of Economic Analysis releases its first revenue 
projections for the year.
The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would 11. 
establish four-year terms for members of the House of Representatives and 
six-year terms for members of the Senate.
Further Study and Advocacy
City Club of Portland should establish a research committee to study alterna-12. 
tive election systems.
City Club of Portland should establish a research committee to prepare a de-13. 
tailed recommendation for a nonpartisan redistricting commission.
City Club should support efforts to increase substantive and objective policy 14. 
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aPPendiX a: CoMMiTTee CHarge, 
MeMBersHiP and ProCess
After interviewing four leading Oregon political figures to understand better how 
partisan behavior influences the Oregon political system, City Club’s Research Board 
and Board of Governors charged your committee with determining if and when 
partisan behavior is an impediment to effective governance and, if so, what should 
be done about it. The primary objectives of the study were to “(1) define partisanship 
and investigate its impact on Oregon’s political system and state government’s ability 
to effectively govern and resolve key issues and (2) recommend possible solutions 
for any negative impacts of partisanship, as well as ways to support elements of the 
political system that should be continued.”
Your committee, which convened in October 2005, includes fourteen City Club mem-
bers who applied for membership on the committee and were screened for conflicts 
of interest. Your committee includes members of both major political parties and 
nonaffiliated voters — registered voters who are not members of any political party. 
At the outset of this study, your committee acknowledged the difficulties inherent in 
analyzing partisanship without reference to individual beliefs or biases. Nevertheless, 
the members of your committee endeavored to conduct its inquiry in a fair and objec-
tive manner. Every effort was made to ensure that your committee’s research and 
deliberations reflected an open, honest and rigorous analysis of this complex issue. 
Your committee gave time and attention to understanding the perspectives of both 
major political parties, as well as the points of view of people from urban, suburban 
and rural Oregon. 
Your committee met weekly to conduct its research and prepare this report. Your 
committee interviewed 41 witnesses including political scientists, lobbyists, pollsters, 
members of the Senate and House of Representatives, legislative staff, directors of 
political parties, members of the media, and former officeholders (Appendix B). Mem-
bers of your committee participated in or observed meetings of different political 
groups. In addition, committee members considered relevant scholarly material and 
monitored media statewide for contemporary information related to the study topic 
(Appendix C).
Your committee also closely monitored the proceedings of the Public Commission on 
the Oregon Legislature. The Commission was created by the 73rd Legislature in Sen-
ate Bill 1084, which passed both houses and was signed by the governor in July 2005. 
All 30 members of the Commission were approved by both the Democratic President 
City Club of Portland
68
Bridging the ParTisan divide
69
of the Senate and by the Republican Speaker of the House. The work of the Commis-
sion was the first review of its kind since 1974. It was given the broad charge of seek-
ing ways to improve the Legislature’s “administration, procedures, facilities, staffing 
and overall capacity” to ensure “that the Legislature can meet the increasing demands 
of legislative work and perform its functions as an equal and coordinate branch of 
state government.” The Commission adopted its final report on November 13, 2006. 
Many of the subjects considered by the Commission were beyond the scope of your 
committee’s study of partisanship. This report highlights those recommendations of 
the Commission that relate to the subject of partisanship. (See Appendix D.) 
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aPPendiX B: WiTnesses
Titles listed below are those held at time of interview:
Vic Atiyeh Former Governor, State of Oregon
Vic Backlund Former Representative, State of Oregon 
Dave Barrows Lobbyist, Dave Barrows & Associates 
Charles Beggs Former journalist, Associated Press 
Bill Bradbury Secretary of State, State of Oregon 
Kate Brown Senate Majority Leader, State of Oregon 
Richard Clucas Political scientist, Portland State University 
Peter Courtney President of the Senate, State of Oregon 
Robert Eisinger Political scientist, Lewis & Clark College 
Sal Esquivel Representative, State of Oregon 
Ted Ferrioli Senate Minority Leader, State of Oregon 
Mike Greenfield Former legislative administrator, State of Oregon 
Paul Gronke Political scientist, Reed College 
Judy Hall Secretary of the Senate, State of Oregon 
Tim Hibbitts Opinion researcher, Davis, Hibbitts & Midghall, Inc. 
Phil Keisling Former Secretary of State, State of Oregon 
Ramona Kenady Chief Clerk of the House, State of Oregon
Amy Langdon Former Executive Director, Oregon Republican Party 
Hans Linde Former Supreme Court Justice, State of Oregon
Bill Lunch Political scientist, Oregon State University 
Jeff Mapes Journalist, The Oregonian 
Pat McCormick Lobbyist, Conkling, Fiskum & McCormick, Inc.
Jeff Merkley Speaker of the House, State of Oregon
Bob Moore Opinion researcher, Moore Information, Inc.
Hardy Myers Attorney General, State of Oregon 
Troy Nichols Staff, Oregon House of Representatives 
Robert Packwood Former state legislator and U.S. Senator 
Norma Paulus Former Secretary of State, State of Oregon 
Neel Pender Former Executive Director, Oregon Democratic Party 
Eileen Qutub Former Representative and Senator, State of Oregon
Charles Ringo Former Senator, State of Oregon
Barbara Roberts Former Governor, State of Oregon 
Jim Scherzinger Former member, Legislative Revenue Committee
Wayne Scott Representative, State of Oregon 
Lane Shetterly Former Representative; Director, Land Conservation and   
 Development Commission, State of Oregon
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Mike Thorne Former Senator, State of Oregon
Tony Van Vliet Former Representative, State of Oregon 
Ben Westlund Senator, State of Oregon
Max Williams Former Representative; Director, Department of Corrections,  
 State of Oregon
Peter Wong Journalist, Statesman Journal 
Duncan Wyse President, Oregon Business Council 
 
In addition, members of your committee attended the 2006 Dorchester Conference in 
Seaside, Oregon, where your committee hosted an open discussion of partisanship in 
the Legislature, and other members of your committee attended the 2006 Money In 
Politics Research Action Forum (MiPRAP) and the Oregon Alliance to Reform Media 
Conference, “Our Media Our Democracy Action Forum.”
City Club of Portland
70
Bridging the ParTisan divide
71
aPPendiX C: BiBliograPHY
Abramowitz, Alan and Kyle Saunders. “Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? The Reality 
of a Polarized America.” The Forum. Vol. 3, No. 2 (2005).
Amy, Douglas J. “How Promotional Representation Elections Work.” PR Library. www.
mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damny/prlib.htm.
Anderson, R. Bruce. “All Is Not Fair: The Effects of Changing Committee Representa-
tion on Partisan Conflict in Transforming Legislatures.” American Politics Quar-
terly. Vol. 28, No. 3 (2000).
Baer, April. “Crossing Over.” Oregon Public Broadcasting, May 15, 2006. 
Bartels, Larry M. “Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996.” American Journal of 
Political Science. Vol. 44, No. 1 (2000).
Brooks, Oakley. “What’s the Open Primary Payoff?” Oregon Business, April 2006.
Buchler, Justin. “Competition, Representation and Redistricting,” Journal of Theoreti-
cal Politics. Vol. 17, No. 4 (2005): 431-63.
The Campaign Legal Center, Council for Excellence in Government, and League of 
Women Voters. “Building a National Redistricting Reform Movement,” April 
2006.
The Center for Media and Public Affairs. “2004 Campaign News Study in Chicago, 
Milwaukee and Portland Markets.” Presented to The Media Policy Program of the 
Campaign Legal Center, August 10, 2005. 
“A City Club Report on Ballot Measure 65.” City Club of Portland Bulletin. Vol. 91, No. 
13 (October 17, 2008).
The Council for Excellence in Government and The Campaign Legal Center. “The 
Shape of Representative Democracy,” June 2005.
Clucas, Richard A., Mark Henkels, and Brent S. Steel, eds. Oregon Politics and Govern-
ment: Progressive Versus Conservative Populists. Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2005.
City Club of Portland
72
Bridging the ParTisan divide
73
Comer, John C. and James B. Johnson, eds. Nonpartisanship in the Legislative Process: 
Essays on the Nebraska Legislature. Washington, D.C.: University Press of Ameri-
ca, 1983.
Drake, Peter. “Instant Runoff Voting: The Time Has Come,” 2005.  
www.blueoregon.com/2005/03/instant_runoff_.html.
Editorial Board. The Oregonian. 
“At Long Last, A Warrior for Tax Reform,” March 5, 2006. 
“It’s Not Just a Matter of Time in Salem,” November 13, 2005. 
“Oregon’s Wild Ride with Term Limits: Mark Simmons’ Experience as Oregon 
House Speaker Holds Lessons for Voters Reconsidering Legislative Limits,” 
November 2, 2006. 
“Political Parties May Howl, But Voters Would Cheer,” November 14, 2005.
Eilperin, Juliet, Fight Club Politics: How Partisanship is Poisoning the House of Represen-
tatives. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006.
Federal Communications Commission. “Do Local Owners Deliver More Localism? 
Some Evidence from Local Broadcast News.” June 17, 2004. 
Fiorina, Morris P. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. New York: Longman 
Press, 2004.
Gross, Terri. “A Political Warning Shot: ‘American Theocracy.’” NPR Online, April 19, 
2006.
Har, Janie. “Beaverton Senator Won’t Run for Re-Election.” The Oregonian, January 
19, 2006.
Hill, Gail Kinsey.  
“A Deepening Divide: Central Oregon.” The Oregonian, November 9, 2003. 
“Seeing Beyond the Trees.” The Oregonian, November 11, 2003. 
“A Way of Life in Flux.” The Oregonian, November 10, 2003. 
Hirsch, Sam and Thomas E. Mann. “For Election Reform, a Heartening Defeat.” The 
New York Times, November 11, 2005.
Howland, G., and N. Shapiro. “Moderate Landslide.” Seattle Weekly, September 15, 
2004.
Kayser, Mark A., and Drew A. Linzer. “Electoral Competitiveness: Toward a Universal 
Measure.” April 2007.
City Club of Portland
72
Bridging the ParTisan divide
73
Kitzhaber, John. Civic Engagement—Revival or Decline? Paper presented April 12, 
2005.
Kremer, Rob. “Party Favors.” BrainstormNW, March 2006.
League of Women Voters of Lane County. “Oregon Primary Election May 16, 2006.” 
Vol. 3, No. 1 (2006).
League of Women Voters of Portland. “Nonpartisan Voters’ Guide: May 16, 2006 
Primary Election Candidates.” Vol. 36, No. 1 (2006).
Linde, Hans.  
“Email to Wade Fickler,” July 7, 2005.  
“Portland City Club Committee: Items for Study of ‘Partisanship,’” December, 15, 
2005.
Macpherson, Greg. “One Ballot Plan Worth Support.” Lake Oswego Review, March 3, 
2006.
“Making the Initiative Work for Oregon: A City Club Report on Reforming the Initia-
tive, Referendum and Referral Systems in Oregon.” City Club of Portland Bulletin. 
Vol. 90, No. 32 (January 11, 2008).    
Mapes, Jeff.  
“Backers Start Push for Open Primary.” The Oregonian, November 9, 2005.  
“Growing Its Own Way: Southern Oregon.” The Oregonian, November 3, 2003. 
“Leaning Left, Portlandia Looks to Right Itself.” The Oregonian, November 2, 
2003.  
“Wise to its Future.” The Oregonian, November 18, 2003.
Mapes, Jeff, Alex Pulaski and Gail Kinsey Hill. “The Nine States of Oregon,” The Orego-
nian, November 2, 2003.
McCarty, N., K.I. Poole and H. Rosenthal. “Does Gerrymandering Cause Polariza-
tion?” December, 20, 2006. http://www.princeton.edu/~nmccarty/papers.htm.
Merkley, Jeff. “Letter to the Public Commission on the Oregon Legislature,” May 9, 
2006.
Morse, Frank. “Re: Partisanship.” Email sent to the Process Committee, Public Com-
mission on the Legislature, May 9, 2006.
National Conference of State Legislatures. Changes in Sizes of State Legislatures (2003).
City Club of Portland
74
Bridging the ParTisan divide
75
National Public Radio. “Departing Congressman Wary of Bipartisan Trend.” All Things 
Considered, May 22, 2006.
O’Donnell, Patrick J. “A Unicameral Legislature.” Journal of the American Society of 
Legislative Clerks and Secretaries (1996).
Oregon State Legislature. “How An Idea Becomes A Law.” www.leg.state.or.us/bills_
laws.htm.
Pildes, Richard H., “The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics.” Harvard Law 
Review. 28 (2004).
Public Commission on the Oregon Legislature. “A Blueprint for a 21st Century Legis-
lature,” November 13, 2006.
Pulaski, Alex.  
“An Area Ripe for Change.” The Oregonian, November 17, 2003.  
“Plying an Idle Economy.” The Oregonian, November 16, 2003. 
“A Region on the Ropes.” The Oregonian, November 4, 2003.
Rosenthal, Alan, et al. The Case for Representative Democracy: What Americans Should 
Know about Their Legislatures. National Conference of State Legislatures (2001).
Reynolds, Maura. “DeLay Takes Parting Shot at Liberals as He Exits House.” The 
Oregonian, June 9, 2006.
Shields, Mark. “The People Have Spoken.” National Public Radio Online: This 
I Believe, March 3, 2006. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=5256345 . 
Sinks, James. “Media Have Retreated from Political Coverage.” The Bend Bulletin, 
September 27, 2006.
“Structure and Process of the Oregon Legislature.” City Club of Portland Bulletin. Vol. 
78, No. 36 (January 31, 1997).    
Toobin, Jeffrey, “The Great Election Grab: When Does Gerrymandering Become a 
Threat to Democracy?” The New Yorker, December 8, 2003.
United States Elections Project. “Enhancing Competitiveness in Redistricting.” www.
elections.gmu.edu/enhancing.htm. 
Walsh, Edward. “Commission of Lawmakers Discuss Their Jobs’ Barriers.” The Orego-
nian, November 8, 2005.
City Club of Portland
74
Bridging the ParTisan divide
75
Wiggins, C., K. Hamm, and C. Bell. “Interest-Group and Party Influence Agents in the 
Legislative Process: A Comparative State Analysis.” The Journal of Politics. Vol. 54, 
No. 1 (1992).
Williams, Christina. “Leadership Version 2.0: A New Oregon Requires a New Way of 
Doing Business.” Oregon Business, January 2006.
Wong, Peter.  
“Man Behind Familiar Byline Ends Career Today.” Statesman Journal, October 31, 
2005. 
“Women Who Blazed Trails in Politics to be Honored.” Statesman Journal, Octo-
ber 24, 2005. 
Wright, G. and B. Schaffner. “The Influence of Party: Evidence From The Legislatures.” 
The American Political Science Review. Vol. 96 (2002).
Wrzenski, Rhonda. “Nebraska’s Asterisk: Vote Structuring in the ‘Non-Existent’ Leg-
islature.” B.A. Thesis. Hastings College, May 2003.
Wyse, Duncan. “Before Public Commission on the Oregon Legislature,” May 22, 2006.
Zakaria, Fareed. “Too Much of a Good Thing,” The Future of Freedom. New York: Nor-
ton Press, 2004.
City Club of Portland
76
Bridging the ParTisan divide
77
aPPendiX d: seleCTed  
reCoMMendaTions of THe PUBliC 
CoMMission on THe oregon  
legislaTUre, 2006
The Public Commission on the Oregon Legislature made twenty-four recommenda-
tions. They are grouped into four main categories: Recommendations for Funda-
mental Reform, Recommendations for Institutional Reform, Recommendations for 
Reforming Legislative Operations, and Recommendations for Improving Facilities 
and Technology. The following are the recommendations relating to issues discussed 
in this report. The full list of recommendations made by the Public Commission is 
available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/pcol/home.htm.
Recommendations for Fundamental Reform 
Open Primary* 
Oregon should adopt an “open” primary, allowing all Oregon voters to nominate •	
two candidates to appear on the general election ballot regardless of political 
party affiliation, or lack of party affiliation, of the elector or candidate.
Nonpartisan Legislature
Members of each house should determine whether they want to be elected with •	
partisan labels. One house may choose to be nonpartisan and the other not. 
However, both houses and the Governor would need to approve legislation to 
modify the definition of “nonpartisan” office. 
Nonpartisan State Controller
Create a nonpartisan statewide State Controller, to be selected in a manner de-•	
termined by law, to manage, administer and oversee state elections and elections 
policy, campaign finance administration, investigations including elections and 
ethics issues, and legislative redistricting. . . . Redistricting will be managed by 
the State Controller consistent with the recommendations made in a separate 
proposal for a five-member redistricting commission. . . . The State Controller’s 
*  The PCOL used the term “open primary” loosely. In essence, the PCOL called for what is more 
commonly understood, in the political science literature, as a “top-two primary”.
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term of office should be no fewer than six years. The office holder will be barred 
from seeking statewide elected office until two years after the expiration of the 
six-year term.
Redistricting Commission
Establish a redistricting commission responsible for drafting legislative and •	
congressional district plans under administration of the State Controller, a new 
position.
Initiative Reform
Require citizen initiative or referendum chief petitioner(s) to be registered voters •	
in Oregon. . . . 
Require a notarized statement indicating the identities and physical addresses •	
of the top five contributors to a ballot measure signature-gathering effort to be 
disclosed in the Voters’ Pamphlet. . . . 
Establish a regular process for considering and possibly taking legislative action •	
on initiative proposals. . . .
Campaign Finance
Appoint a Commission on Campaign Finance Reform to examine the role of cam-•	
paign finance in legislative decision-making. Reform the use of campaign funds 
by candidates and elected officials. Improve legislator compensation in conjunc-
tion with reforms related to use of campaign funds by candidates and elected 
officials. Consider moving the primary election date to the first Tuesday in June 
or August.
Legislator Compensation
The Public Officials Compensation Commission (POCC) should be given respon-•	
sibility for establishing salaries for state elected officials, removing political con-
sideration from that process. The commission will set salaries for: the Governor; 
Secretary of State; State Treasurer; Attorney General; Superintendent of Public 
Instruction; Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries; Judges of the 
Supreme Court; Judges of the Court of Appeals; Circuit Court Judges; Tax Court 
Judges; District Attorneys and Legislators. Salaries of elected officials should 
be based on the duties of the office and at a level that will attract citizens of the 
highest quality to public service.
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Recommendations for Institutional Reform 
Annual Sessions and Session Structure
The Legislative Assembly should establish a new meeting time for the 2007 •	
legislative session and hold a legislative session in 2008. The Legislature must de-
termine how and whether it is desirable to have annual sessions beginning with 
the 2009 session.
Partisanship
Presiding officers should, in practice, represent the body as a whole, and not •	
use authority to prevent debate. Develop a more collaborative environment for 
discussions by majority and minority leadership regarding legislative priorities. 
Establish collaborative processes that include the minority in session manage-
ment. Allow measures, with demonstrable evidence of a majority of members in 
support, to move to the floor for debate and vote. House and Senate Rules should 
not be used for the purpose of foreclosing access to significant policy issues. 
Require Vice-Chairs to be from minority parties.
Staffing Legislative Offices
Separate issue-area staff and committee staff in an effort to professionalize issue-•	
area staff, make them more accessible to all members, and acknowledge relation-
ships between chairs and committee staff.
Public Access
The Legislative Assembly should take steps to improve public access to the legis-•	
lative process, including providing more notice about committee meetings and 
consideration of legislation.
Recommendations for Reforming Legislative Operations 
Committees
Enhance legislator orientation curriculum to include more training in subject •	
matter and procedural areas. Require comprehensive work plans for interim 
committees that prepare members for upcoming sessions. Increase continuity of 
both members and staff from session to interim committees. Maximize use of 
work groups and emphasize breadth of membership to reflect as many view-
points in a policy discussion as possible. Require minority parties to select their 
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committee members in proportion to membership of the body. Require presiding 
officers and members of each body to “institutionalize” the appointment of one 
or more members of a minority party to chair one or more significant commit-
tees or subcommittees. Keep the ability to open or reopen committees when 
needed during session to ensure that legislators experienced in particular subject 
areas are working on related bills. Establish and adhere to deadlines for commit-
tee actions including bill introductions, hearing deadlines, work session dead-
lines and chamber cross-over dates. Make investments in the above items.
Recommendations for Improving Facilities and Technology
Oregon Channel
The Legislature should assist in funding the Oregon Channel Pilot Program dur-•	
ing the 2007 legislative session to determine the utility of unedited coverage of 
legislative meetings and other public affairs events, such as agency meetings or 
Supreme Court arguments on a dedicated Public Broadcasting television channel.
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aPPendiX e: oregon governors 





Length of  
Session 
(Days)




















51 1961 Mark Hatfield (R) Jean Lewis,  
Portland (D)  










53 1965 Mark Hatfield (R) Harry Boivin, Kla-
math Falls (D)
F. F. Montgomery, 
Eugene (R)
127
54 1967 Tom McCall (R) E.D. Potts,  
Grants Pass (D)
F. F. Montgomery, 
Eugene (R)
157
55 1969 Tom McCall (R) E.D. Potts,  
Grants Pass (D)
Roger F. Smith, 
Burns (R)
131
56 1971 Tom McCall (R) John D. Burns, 
Portland (D)
Roger F. Smith, 
Burns (R)
151





58 1975 Bob Straub (D) Jason Boe,  
Reedsport (D)
Phil Lang,  
Portland (D)
153
59 1977 Bob Straub (D) Jason Boe,  
Reedsport (D)
Phil Lang,  
Portland (D)
177
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63 1985 Vic Atiyeh (R) John Kitzhaber, 
Roseburg (D)
Vera Katz,  
Portland (D)
159




Vera Katz,  
Portland (D)
168




Vera Katz,  
Portland (D)
177










68 1995 John Kitzhaber (D) Gordon Smith, 
Pendleton (R)
Bev Clarno,  
Bend (R)
153
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